RAW Chief Meets Rajapakshe Sri Lanka, SomeThing is Brewing

“On 26 April 1988, A. Verma, the head ( Read an exclusive interview with A.K. Verma which published by the Sri Lanka Guardian on 2008 )  of RAW, flew into Colombo. Verma’s visit was known only to a handful of men in Indian and Sri Lanka. In Colombo, only three men knew about it. They were M.M. Gunaratne, Director-General, Intelligence and Security, Ministry of Defence, under whom the Special Task Force (STF) and National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) were placed, Zerny Wijesuriya, Director, National Intelligence Bureau (NIB) and President Jayewardene himself. Even people like Dixit, the high profile Indian High Commissioner, Gamini Dissanayake, influential minister and co-architect of the Accord, General Sepala Attygalle, Defence Secretary, General Cyril Ranatunge, the General Officer Commanding the Joint Operations Command, and W.M.P. B. Manikdewela, the Secretary to the President did not know. Lalith Athulathmudali, the National Security Minister, was also not fully informed – perhaps he would have been partly informed by the effective private intelligence network he operated.

In India, Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister, Grirish Chandra Saxena, the National Security Adviser to the Indian Prime Minister, Chandrasekaran alias Chandran of RAW and only two or three other officials knew. Subsequently, when two prominent Sri Lankans in the government became aware of the RAW connection, they were very annoyed.

Verma travelled undercover and spent about 48 hours in Colombo. He tried to convince Jayewardene the LTTE was interested in joining the mainstream and that he should cooperate with the negotiating intermediary – RAW. Verma held discussions with M.M. Gunaratne on the morning of 27 April. He was well informed about the conflict, and had personally negotiated with the TULF, the militant groups including the LTTE, and was keen to obtain certain assurances from President Jayewardene before he once again met with Kittu in Madras. Verma stated that all Tamil groups were agreeable to enter the political process. He stated that the LTTE too was keen to do so, but subject to certain conditions being satisfied.

28 April 1988 was historic day when the head of RAW met President Jayewardene. According to a high level source in New Delhi, Jayewardene was cautious. However, he cooperated at least at the beginning, and even Gandhi who intensely disliked the LTTE thought that with the support of Jayewardene, India will be successful in striking a deal with the LTTE. Verma said the LTTE is keen to “surrender 700 of the estimated 1,000 big weapons the LTTE have in their possession and they would like to retain 300 weapons for their security.” Verma added: “With the surrender, a ceasefire would be announced. The LTTE would thereafter publicly support the Accord. The balance weapons will be released gradually, once the LTTE feels assured that a climate of security has descended on the North and East.” Verma asked President Jayewardene whether he could respond to the LTTE by announcing that the Government of Sri Lanka will hold elections in the North and East for once council (under Article 37 A of the Provincial Councils Act). This was to be done when the groups were ready to enter the political process and before the date of the elections for the North and East was to be announced, and soon after all other elections were completed. Verma stated that a referendum as stipulated in the Accord would subsequently be necessary, for people to accept or reject the merger.’ Verma requested Jayewardene to make two other public statements regarding two LTTE requests as an explicit demonstration of goodwill and gesture towards the LTTE. One was to be on the release of detainees in custody. RAW was told that 3,634 had been released and only 627 were in custody, and that even they would be released in due course. The other request was on the use of the 1982 electoral register for the elections. The President agreed to the latter.