¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrineâ€
is a
mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use
on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints,
but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended
to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a
crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation
of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited
penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing
Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in
India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a
nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the
government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold
Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future
implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start
given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment
of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to
implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-
linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of
the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice.
At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and
may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these
factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in
the plan’s existence than in any real world application. End Summary.
What It Is and What It Is Not
—————————–
¶2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised
by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration
into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over
some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without
threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear
response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or
occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the
Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal
2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy
process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility,
and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from
Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners
to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start’s
genesis).
¶3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military
mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold
Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been
given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward
positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed
and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry
would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance
and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant
air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel
planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for
the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further
analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).
¶4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is
that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield
the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action
against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the
international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty
of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if
the plan is never actually implemented — and there is considerable question
as to GOI intent to ever implement it — news of Cold Start’s existence
has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance
to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for
attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear
destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the
added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in
theory may have some deterrent value.
Prospects for Cold Start
————————
¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start
is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in
April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by
the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold
Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is
with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-
making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a
factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as
a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn
could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-
making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an
incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military
action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on
Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the
military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc
nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and
the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not
clearly understood.
¶6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian
military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that
India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could
have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical
difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various
resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range
from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold
Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large
number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not
have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani
Punjab and Sindh.
¶7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is
designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear
response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain
from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response,
GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan
will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a
resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys
in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.
Comment
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¶8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in
Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani
thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start
even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which
calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt the
Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since
2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent
terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled.
This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani
mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of
sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders
to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after
a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public
response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all
or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several
very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about
their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported,
or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National
Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the
army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is
less clear. ROEMER
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