Ramanisblog

Tag: Department of Telecommunications

  • 2G Scam-SC Verdict -70 Millions Switch, Govt.Gets Rs.13,740 Crore.

    Telecom Regulatory Authority of India
    Image via Wikipedia

    Apart from cancelling  122 Licences, the SC has confirmed that there has been a loss to the Government  despite Kabil Sibal’s assertion to the contrary, the important fact is that the government has netted additional 13,740 crores.

    The Customers numbering about 70 Millions may have to switch operators.

    Real fall out is that the crime has been confirmed and consequently the perpetrators, hopefully, will be punished.

    The Government has been trying to side track the issue by declaring that there was no loss and CAG’s figures were notional.

    With Dr.Subramanian Swami breathing down the neck of P.Chidambaram, whose compliance in this scam is a certainty,the case is expected to turn the heat on the Congress and probably set in motion a new alignment at the centre and the next election may well be a water shed in India Political History.

    “The cancellation of licences held by nine telecom companies will straightaway bring Rs 13,740 crore to the Government apart from the expected bonanza from the spectrum auction.

    The clauses 5(G) (xiii) and 6 of telecom licence guidelines empower the Government to confiscate the entry fee, Finance Bank Guarantee (FBG) and Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) in the event of licence cancellation due to the fault and fraud committed by the telecom operators.
    According to Thursday’s judgement given by Supreme Court judges Justices GS Singhvi and AK Ganguly, all the 122 licences were cancelled because they were awarded in “illegal, arbitrary and unconstitutional” ways. “Hence the entire amount paid by them would be deemed to be confiscated,” said a top DoT official.
    These nine companies paid Rs 9,013.94 crore as entry fee, which is now non-refundable as the court has held that the companies violated norms. For the licences, these companies paid Rs 3,390 crore as FBG and Rs 1,316 crore as PBG. In total, these operators deposited Rs 13,719.94 when they obtained licence in the controversial 2G spectrum allocation.
    “In case of not adhering to licence conditions envisaged in para 5.G, the licence(s) granted to the company shall be deemed as cancelled and the licensor (Department of Telecom) shall have the right to encash the performance/financial bank guarantee(s) and the licensor (Department of Telecom) shall not be liable for loss of any kind,” say the clause 5G(xiii) of the existing Guidelines for Unified Access Services License, which came into force in December 2005. The clause 6 specifically mentions that the entry fee is “non-refundable”.
    The SC verdict is in line with the CAG report which found that entire licences were allotted in illegal ways. The CAG report specifically mentioned that out of the 122 licences, 85 licences owned by Swan Telecom, Unitech, Loop, Videocon and STel were totally “ineligible” and based on forged documents.
    The confiscated figure of Rs 13,719.94 crore from the cancelled licences will be in addition to the Rs 20 crore in the form of fine these companies will have to pay as per court’s directive. The SC had imposed Rs 5 crore as fine each on three companies for offloading shares to foreign companies and Rs 50 lakh was imposed on four companies for other violations.
    ”

    “Customers will not be impacted from the cancellation of licences, TRAI Chairman reportedly said..

    Nearly 70 million subscribers may have to change their operators as a result of the Supreme Court’s ruling to cancel licences, according to reports.

    The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India reportedly said that there will not be much impact on customers as around 95% subscribers belong to operators which got licences before January 2008.

    “Customers will not be impacted from the cancellation of licences, TRAI Chairman reportedly said.

    The Supreme Court has given a four-month window to the Government and the operators to implement its orders.
    Source:
    Related articles

  • 2G-Criminal Conspiracy Charge against Essar,Reliance Communications?

    Wordmark of Essar. Trademarked by Essar.
    Image via Wikipedia

    For those who have been following 2G scam,I have found some additional information on the subject through

    http://soniajaspal.wordpress.com/2011/04/17/weekly-roundup-%E2%80%93-17-april-2011-2g-telecom-scam-story/

    Story:

    The CBI will charge India’s top conglomerates the Essar Group and Relaince ADAG with criminal conspirary and cheating in the multi billion dollar 2G Telecom Licenses Scandal.This Corruption Scam was brought directly under the control of the Supreme Court as the government failed to move against powerful businessmen and politicians.Now the investigative agencies which have broken free from the ruling party’s interference have given the status of the investigation to the Court.The CBI has said that the 2 companies Loop and Swan Telecom were used as front companies by established telecom operators Essar and Reliance Communications to get more license.Note this defeated the entire exercise and there is ample circumstantial evidence to prove that the telecom minister Raja and his cronies connived with the companies to give precious spectrum for a song.Massive kickbacks were given through real estate companies like DB Realty whose top billionaire owners are cooling their heels in jail as well.

    It remains to be seen whether the top corporate executives of India’s topmost conglomerates get prosecuted over these wrongdoings.Essar and ADAG are amongst the top 10 conglomerates in India with wide ranging operations with billions of dollars in revenues nationally as well as internationally.The Supreme Court has been instrumental in bringing this case so far as the government seems totally coopted by corruption.It has been frequently been castigated by the Supreme Court and has shamelessly defended corrupt bureaucrats and politicians.It remains to be seen how this 2G Telecom Case ends.If justice is done,then it may provide a new chapter to India’s corruption ridden story till now.

    http://greenworldinvestor.com/2011/03/29/cbi-2g-telecom-scandal-criminal-conspiracycheating-charge-against-essarreliance-communicationswill-sc-throw-top-executives-in-jail-like-raja/

    Related:

    Sitaram’s letter had identified three elements in the telecom scam. One was of course giving away 122 licenses at 2001 prices in 2008. In 2001, there were barely 4 million mobile subscribers as against 300 million subscribers in 2008. With this expansion of the telecom market, using 2001 prices in 2008 was nothing but providing largesses to friends and relations. While the media focussed on this aspect of the scam, there were also two other components. One was the conversion of CDMA licenses to Unified Access Services (UAS), by virtue of which Reliance and Tata entered the GSM based mobile services. The third was the extra spectrum that the existing operators had hogged beyond their originally sanctioned amount. The table below summarises the amounts computed by the CPI(M) as in the letter to PM by Sitaram Yechury and the computations by CAG.

    Item

    Approx. Amount

    CAG Calculations

    Loss due to 122 licenses for new entrants in 2008

    Rs. 124,000 crore

    Rs. 102,498 crore

    Loss due to cross-over licenses permitted to CDMA operators (Dual Technology License)

    36,000 crore

    Rs. 37,154 crore

    Estimated loss due to excess spectrum occupied by the GSM operators beyond allotted 6.2 MHz

    Rs. 30,000 crore

    Rs 36,729 crore

    Total

    Rs.190,000 crore

    Rs 1,76,379 crore

    These figures are now longer conjectures of experts or figures computed by people who could be accused of being critical of the Government. These are figures worked out by a bunch of government auditors who had access to the files of the Department of Telecom and have come to their independent conclusions.

    Who were the major beneficiaries of the scam? As the CAG Report makes clear, not only were the new licenses for 2G undervalued, but certain parties picked out for special favours. Swan and Unitech, the two real estate companies, were particular favourites. The second set of beneficiaries were the CDMA license holders — Reliance and Tata — who were given cross-over licenses for the bigger GSM market. The third were those GSM operators – Vodafone and Bharati in particular — who were holding spectrum well-beyond their original allotted spectrum.

    The CAG report has also substantiated the charges made in the letter that Sitaram Yechury had written regarding violations of TRAI recommendations and disregarding the advise of other Ministries. The Report states, “The entire process of spectrum allocation was undertaken in an arbitrary manner. The Hon’ble Prime Minister had stressed on the need for a fair and transparent allocation of spectrum, and the Ministry of Finance, and the Ministry of Law and Justice had sought for the decision regarding spectrum pricing to be considered by an EGoM. Brushing aside these concerns and advices, the Department of Telecommunications, in 2008, proceeded to issue 122 new licences for 2G spectrum at 2001 prices, thus flouting all rules and procedures to be followed in a parliamentary democratic set up. The process followed for spectrum allocation was also unfair, considering the fact that DoT did not follow its own guidelines on eligibility conditions, arbitrarily changed the cut off date for receipt of applications post facto and altered the conditions of the FCFS (first-come first-served) procedure it had been following, gave unfair advantage of certain companies over others thus creating an environment which can not be perceived as transparent and fair.”

    As the CAG Report makes clear, the manipulations to the stated first-come first-served policies were done to benefit certain parties. It again substantiates what Yechury had brought out in his May letter to the PM. The original first-come first-served had the application date as defining who are first-come. On Jan 10, 2010 this was changed to who fulfils LOI conditions first amongst the parties selected. CAG states, “Thus DoT deviated from its declared FCFS (first-cum-first-served) policy though MOCIT (Minister of Communications & IT) maintained that it was continuing ‘with the policy for processing of applications’

    http://www.newsclick.in/india/cag-report-raja-has-no-clothes

  • 2G Spectrum .CAG Report.Excerpts.

    Performance Audit Report on the Issue of Licenses and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications iii

    Executive Summary

    In the last two decades the telecom sector witnessed rapid transformation with the National Telecom Policy-94 setting the stage for opening up of the sector. With changes in the sector, cellular mobile services outgrew the fixed line services. The most important change was the shift to a revenue sharing regime in National Telecom Policy (NTP) 1999 where the operators shared their revenue with the Government in the form of annual licence fee and spectrum charges. The Unified Access Services Licence (UASL) 2003 sought to frame the road map for a uniform licencing regime.  This sector has witnessed dynamic and rapid transition. It had been subject to audit and a report titled “Package of Concessions Given to Cellular Mobile Operators” was presented to Parliament in May 2000. A further review of the “Revenue Management in the Department of Telecommunications” was also undertaken by this office in 2004-05. This review mainly focused on the system of collection and accounting of licence fee and spectrum charges from the licensees. The Report based on this review was presented to Parliament in May 2006.  In January 2008, Department of Telecommunications issued 120 new licences for unified access services on the same day. These licences were issued at price which had been discovered in 2001. Issuance of 120 licences in just one day and at a price discovered in 2001 has drawn the attention of Media, Parliament and informed members of the civil society. Questions have been raised regarding the transparency in the allocation process and the failure in maximization of revenue generation from the allocation of spectrum, which is a national asset. This department had been receiving innumerable references from Members of Parliament and other sources repeatedly, questioning the allocation process and the price fixed for such allocation. The claim in each such reference is that ineligible applicants seem to have been granted licences and at a price which appeared far below what has been perceived to be the appropriate market price in 2008. It was in this context that this department felt that there was a sufficient justification to review the entire process of issuance of licences, award of spectrum and the implementation of the UAS regime. The need for doing so was further justified as six years have passed since the introduction of the UAS regime in 2003. While accepting the Government’s prerogative to formulate the policy of UASL, it was felt that an in-depth examination of implementation of such policy needed to be done.

     

    I. Changes in the Telecommunications sector in India

    II. Why did we decide to do an audit on the Issue of License and allocation of Spectrum now?

    iv Issue of Licenses and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications

    Chapter 1 and 2 of this Report give the Policy Overview, System of issue of licences & allotment  of spectrum and the Audit Approach. In Chapter 3, we have narrated the Audit findings relating to the implementation of UAS policy and Chapter 4 details the findings on the procedural lapses. Chapter 5 attempts to highlight the various indicators available to assess the presumptive value of spectrum. To attempt at deriving a maximum realizable economic value for allocation of 2G spectrum licences in 2008, recourse would have to be taken to a menu of different economic models. Each such model would be based on certain assumptions which may not necessarily be obtained when Government decides on a price for a scarce national asset as there would be no foolproof market discovery mechanism at any point of time. Each set of assumptions underlying the economic models could be open to questions and be disputed. For this reason we have only attempted to arrive at a presumptive value in this Report.  In August 2003 TRAI had submitted a Report recommending a road map for allocation of licences. This Report formed the basis for the UAS policy approved by the Council of Ministers in October 2003. The implementation of UASL regime was to be carried out in two phases with first phase of six months assigned for migration of already existing Basic Service Operators (BSOs) and Cellular Mobile Service Operators (CMSOs) to the new regime. The entry fee for migration of BSOs was determined as the fee equal to what was paid by the fourth cellular operator introduced through multi-stage bidding process in 2001. CMSOs were not required to pay any entry fee for migrating as they had already entered the market through a bidding process and thus paid a market determined price.  The second phase was to start after the first phase in which a Unified Licencing regime, with a nominal entry fee for the licence with the spectrum being charged separately, was envisaged. However, Audit examination reveals that the Department of Telecom did not implement the licensing regime as approved by the Cabinet and implemented only the first phase of the policy, overlooking the second phase. In the actual implementation, the interim stage of implementation seems to have become the final destination. This appears to have

    become the underlying factor, quite erroneously, to value the spectrum in 2008 at 2001 prices. An important objective of this policy decision to delink the prices of spectrum from the issue of licence and devise an efficient allocation formula for spectrum along with an appropriate price, remained unachieved. Ministry of Finance was authorized by the Cabinet decision of 2003 to participate in the discussion for efficient allocation of spectrum and price fixation but DOT decided not to associate the Ministry of Finance.

     

    III. How this Report is Organised?

     

    IV. Major Findings

     

    (i) Gaps in policy implementation

    Issue of Licences and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications v

    As a consequence of such lacunae in the implementation of the policy laid down by the Council of Ministers in 2003 the issuance of licences in 2008 along with allocation of spectrum has been done by DoT at prices determined in 2001 which were based on a totally nascent market despite the sector witnessing substantial transformation and manifold growth. The issue was never placed before Cabinet for a review.

     

    (Paras 3.1, 3.2, 3.3)

    From a scrutiny of the records and information made available it appears that the High Powered Telecom Commission which also includes part time members from the Ministry of Finance, Industry, IT and Planning Commission was not apprised of the TRAI recommendations of August 2007 and hence, was not afforded an opportunity to deliberate on the merits of the TRAI recommendations. It is also seen that the High Powered Telecom Commission was not even consulted at the time of grant of 122 UAS licences in 2008.

     

    (Paras 4.2, 4.5)

    It was noted in Audit that DoT managed to keep the issue of spectrum pricing outside the purview of the GoM. The GoM’s role in December 2006 was confined to issues concerning spectrum vacation. The ToRs left out the other two issues of efficient allocation and pricing, while all three were pronounced in the policy decision of 2003. Thus by getting the spectrum pricing issue deleted from the ToR, the DoT completely side-tracked the pricing issues.

     

    (Para 3.2)

    It has also been revealed in the course of audit that the Ministry of Finance, in November 2007, had questioned the sanctity of continuing with the price determined way back in 2001 without any indexation or current valuation. The Ministry had sought a review of the matter. This advice of the Ministry of Finance was overlooked by the DoT ostensibly on the basis of a four-year old Cabinet decision (October 2003) on the premise that it was authorized to calculate the entry fee for licences as per the recommendations of TRAI in 2003 . DoT maintained that ‘spectrum pricing was within the normal work carried out by them.’

     

    (Para 4.5)

     

    (ii) Telecom Commission was not consulted

    (iii) Views and concerns of Ministry of Finance overruled

    vi Issue of Licences and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications

    In October 2007 at its own initiative, the DoT requested the Ministry of Law and Justice to obtain and communicate the opinion of the Attorney General/Solicitor General of India to enable the DoT to handle an unprecedented rush of applications in a fair and equitable manner which would be legally tenable. The Ministry of Law, at the level of the Hon’ble Minister, opined that in view of the importance of the case and the various options which seem to have emerged, it was necessary that the whole issue be first considered by an Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) and in that process legal opinion of the Attorney General can be obtained. Surprisingly, this opinion, which the DoT had sought on its own volition, was felt to be ‘out of context’ at the level of the Hon’ble MoC&IT and hence the benefit of a discussion in the EGoM was also forgone. Thus, such important decisions seem to have been taken in DoT without the issues being deliberated and discussed at an inter ministerial forum.

     

    (Para 4.3)

    In November 2007, the Hon’ble Prime Minister wrote to Hon’ble MoC&IT and expressed concern that in the backdrop of the inadequate spectrum and the unprecedented number of applications received for fresh licenses, spectrum pricing through a fair and transparent method of auction for revision of entry fee, which is currently benchmarked on an old figure, needs to be reconsidered. This advice of the Hon’ble Prime Minister evoked an immediate response from the Hon’ble MoC&IT who on the same day replied that the issue of auction of spectrum was considered by the TRAI and the Telecom Commission and it was not recommended by them as the existing licence holders had already got spectrum upto 10 mega hertz per circle without any spectrum charge. Hon’ble MoC&IT further informed that his Ministry has come to the conclusion that it will be unfair, discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious to auction spectrum to new applicants as it will not give them a level playing field. He had thus, justified the allotment of spectrum to a few new operators in 2008 without reconsidering the old entry fee discovered in 2001 ignoring the advice of the Hon’ble Prime Minister.

     

    (Para 4.4)

    The TRAI report of August 2007 had recommended ‘no cap’ on the number of licences in any service area. Despite this recommendation of TRAI, the DoT issued a Press Release on 24th September 2007 stating that applications for issue of licences would be accepted only upto 1.10.2007. This action, in effect, conveyed fixation of an artificial cap in the number of licenses to be awarded. However, in its response (July 2010) to the report issued to the Ministry (July 2010), the Ministry has stated that it accepted the recommendation of ‘no cap’ by the TRAI in October 2007. It seems that the Ministry, by

    (iv) Advice of Ministry of Law and Justice were ignored

    (v) Hon’ble Prime Minister’s suggestions were not followed

    (vi) Arbitrary changes by DoT in the cut-off date.

    Issue of Licences and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications vii

    issuing the press release in advance in September 2007 had, in effect, circumvented the recommendation of TRAI by taking an action counter to the recommendation and its acceptance by DoT in October 2007. To further compound the earlier decision, of restricting consideration of applications received up to 1.10.2007, the DoT further advanced this date to restrict issuance of Letters of Intent (LoIs) only to applications received up to 25.09.2007. This was ostensibly to avoid legal implications in view of the shortage of spectrum for GSM services.

     

    (Paras 4.1.2, 4.6)

    The First Come First Served (FCFS) policy earlier internally adopted in DoT for allocation of spectrum,was then extended for issue of new UAS licences. Under this policy, all applications are registered in the Central Registry Section of DoT where date of receipt and serial numbers are posted on it. Priority of applications is determined based on this date of receipt in the Central Registry. In a communication dated 2nd November 2007, the Hon’ble MoC&IT had even confirmed to the Hon’ble Prime Minister that the processing of applications was to be on the FCFS basis. However, audit found that DoT deviated even from the FCFS policy in letter and spirit. The applications submitted between March 2006 and 25th September 2007 were issued the LoIs simultaneously on a single day, viz. 10th January 2008. A notice was issued through a press release giving less than an hour to collect the same. This decision to issue LoIs simultaneously to all applicants was taken at the level of the Minister. As per the FCFS policy being followed those who were issued LoIs were given 15 days to fulfill the conditions. This included submission of a Performance Bank Guarantee (PBG) and a Financial Bank Guarantee (FBG). By changing the FCFS criteria, some licensees, who could proactively anticipate such procedural changes were ready with the Demand Drafts drawn on dates prior to the notification of cut off date by DoT and could avail the benefit of first right to allocation of spectrum, having jumped the queue. The entire process followed lacked transparency and objectivity and has eroded the credibility of DoT.

     

    (Para 4.6)

    Process followed by the DoT for verification of applications for UAS licences for confirming their eligibility lacked due diligence, fairness and transparency leading to grant of licences to applicants who were not eligible. Eighty five out of the 122 licenses issued in 2008 were found to be issued to Companies which did not satisfy the basic eligibility conditions set by the DoT and had suppressed facts, disclosed incomplete information and submitted fictitious documents for getting UAS licenses and thereby access to spectrum.

     

    (Para 4.7.1)

     

    (vii) FCFS Policy was not followed (viii) Issue of license to ineligible applicants

    viii Issue of Licences and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications

    Any loss ascertained while attempting to value the 2G spectrum allocated to 122 licencees in 2008 can only be ‘presumptive’, given the fact that there are varied determinants like its scarcity value, the nature of competition, business plans envisaged, number of operators, growth of sector etc. which, depending upon the market situation, would throw up the price that it commands at a given point of time. Instead of attempting to come to a specific value of 2G spectrum which could have been possible only through an efficient market discovery process, we have looked at the various indicators to assess a possible (presumptive) value, from the records made available to Audit rather than going for any mathematical/econometric models.

     

    (Para 5.1)

    1. On 5th November 2007 through a letter addressed to the Hon’ble Prime Minister, S Tel limited who was a prospective licencee, having applied for UAS licences in July/ September 2007, had offered to pay a higher price in the shape of additional revenue share for next ten years. The offer was enhanced by the firm with a stipulation to further revise it upwards, in case of any counter bid. At the prices offered by the Company, value of 122 new licenses and 35 Dual Technology licenses after discounting for the receivables in future years works out to ` 65,909 crores as against ` 12,386 crores actually received.

     

    (Para 5.2)

    2. Auction of 3G spectrum was recommended by TRAI in its Report submitted to Government in September 2006. In its Report of 2010, they have observed that it was fair to compare 2G with 3G and recommended 3G prices to be adopted as current price of 2G spectrum in 1800 Mhz band. If these recommendations, which have not so far been accepted by the Government are taken into account, then the value of 2G spectrum allotted to the 122 new licensees and 35 Dual Technology licences would be much higher at about ` 1,52,038 crores as against the amount actually received.

     

    (Para 5.3)

    3. Many of the new UAS licensees of 2008 have been able to attract substantial amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). Value of a new company with no experience in the Telecom sector can primarily be taken as that of the license and access to spectrum. This would have been the prime consideration for foreign companies while infusing large amount of capital in the form of equity in these companies shortly after award of license. Based on this indicator, value of a pan India license works out between ` 7,758 crores and ` 9,100 crores as against ` 1,658 crores priced by DoT. The total value for 122 new licences and 35 Dual Technology licences would be between ` 58,000 to ` 68,000 crores as against the actual revenue of ` 12,386 crores realized.

     

    (Para 5.4)

     

    (ix) Presumptive value of spectrum allocated to 122 new UAS licencees and 35 Dual Technology licencees in 2007-08

    Issue of Licences and Allocation of 2G Spectrum by the Department of Telecommunications ix

    Thus, on the values determined through various indicators, the presumptive value of 2G spectrum on account of grant of 157 licenses in different circles during 2007-08 would be in the range of approximately ` 58,000 crores to ` 1,52,038 crores.

     

    (Para 5.5)

    Spectrum was allotted by DoT to the existing operators beyond the contracted limits without imposing any upfront charge for such allotment. The value of spectrum held by 13 operators for 51 circles based on the 2001 rates worked out to ` 2561 crores. Based on the above indicators, value would be in the range of ` 12,000 crores and ` 37,000 crores. TRAI’s recommendation (2010) for charging this additional quantity of spectrum has not Been accepted by the Government so far.

     

    (Para 4.10, 5.5)

     

    (x) Value of additional spectrum allotted to 13 existing operators beyond contracted quantities

    The presumptive loss as per the methods adopted would be as given in the table below:

    (xi) Presumptive loss of spectrum allocated to 122 new UAS licensees and 35 Dual Technology licenses in 2007-08

     

    CATEGORY CRITERIA FOR WORKING OUT THE POTENTIAL LOSSES TO THE EXCHEQUER IN CRORES OF RUPEES.

     

     

    Category                 S Tel rate  Rates on the basis    SALE OF EQUITY BY NEW LICENSEES

    Of 3 G Auction   UNITECH     SWAN (RELIANCE)

    New Licences              38950  102498                        40442             33230

    Dual Technology        14573     37154             15132              12433

    Beyond contracted

    quantity of 6.2 MHz  13841        36993                        14052              12003

    12003

    ———————————————————————————————————————

    TOTAL CRORES:     67364    176645                        69626              57666

    http://ecopackindia.wordpress.com/2010/12/21/fiscal-terrorism-corruption-in-india/

  • 2G Spectrum Scam-Full Story,Origin,Growth(?) and Modus operandi.

    Idea Cellular Logo
    Image via Wikipedia

    Mahajan ‘assisted’ Reliance Infocomm to become a nationwide operator without paying full licence fee

    Telecom scams are not new. In August 1996, the CBI registered an FIR against former telecom minister Sukh Ram after recovering 3.62 crore from his residences in Delhi and Himachal Pradesh — he made it to the Guinness Book of World Records for the wrong reasons! Thirteen years later, in 2009, he was sentenced to three years of rigorous imprisonment for “criminal conspiracy” and spent time behind bars for a month before being released on bail.

    Raja claimed 2G and 3G spectrums were not comparable, just as basmati rice was not the same as PDS rice

    During the NDA government, there was a major controversy when telecom companies were allowed to move from a licensing regime to a revenue-sharing one. The sudden removal of Jagmohan from the post of communications minister in 1998 was reportedly a consequence of his refusal to toe the line of a section within his government. In July 1999, following the recommendation of a Group of Ministers headed by Jaswant Singh, the fixed licence fee regime was changed to a revenue share one. This was adversely commented on by the CAG. According to Ratan Tata, if a hypothetical amount was to be calculated at that point of time, the loss to the exchequer would be about Rs. 50,000 crore.

    Other ministers for communications during the NDA regime, including the late Pramod Mahajan, were accused of assisting Reliance Infocomm to become a nationwide operator offering “full mobility” in its cellular phone operations without paying the full licence fee. This decision of the DoTwas against TRAI recommendations and the resultant loss to the exchequer was said to be in the region of 1,100 crore. However, the sheer size of the subsequent undervaluation and misallocation of spectrum makes the earlier scandals pale into relative insignificance.

    ON 10 JANUARY 2008, at 2.45 pm, an announcement was posted on the DoT website stating that letters of intent (LOIS) for issuance of licences bundled with spectrum would be given to applicants between 3.30 pm and 4.30 pm. The announcement added that application fees running into thousands of crores of rupees would have to be paid immediately by demand draft, along with supporting documentation.

    It was made clear that LOIS would be issued to those who deposit their fees first, beating others by even a fraction of a second — this was the infamous first come first served (FCFS) system (or the way movie tickets are sold) that privileged not financial wherewithal, technical competence or experience but speed, clout and foreknowledge. Even the FCFS system was not properly adhered to and the CAG categorically stated that those who obtained licences had prior information about how to apply for these LOIS.

    The CAG found that 13 firms that got 85 out of the 122 new licences in 2008 did not satisfy DoT eligibility criteria

    A few months earlier, the cut-off date for receipt of applications for licences was suddenly brought forward to enable particular companies to jump the queue. Here are a few examples: Swan Telecom, which had submitted its application on 2 March 2007, was given a licence with spectrum for Delhi on 28 August 2008, while Spice Communications, which had submitted its application in August 2006, was not given spectrum for the same service area.

    For Maharashtra, Spice, which submitted its application on 31 August 2006, got a licence in May 2009, whereas Unitech and Videocon got their licences with spectrum much earlier in September 2008 though the two companies had submitted their applications for licences more than a year later in September 2007. Idea Cellular (date of application: 26 June 2006) also got a licence in May 2009 while Unitech (date of application: 24 September 2007) got its licence in September 2008.

    THE STORY did not end here. Some of these companies expanded their equity bases by inducting foreign partners who paid large sums of money for the shares. Three examples: in September 2008, Swan Telecom sold 45 percent of its shares to Etisalat (of the United Arab Emirates) for $900 million or around Rs. 4,200 crore — the company had obtained its licence for only Rs. 1,537 crore and did not possess major assets other than a piece of paper, the licence. A month later, Unitech Wireless offloaded 60 percent of its stake to Telenor (of Norway) for Rs. 6,200 crore — this company too counted among its assets only a licence for which it paid Rs. 1,651 crore in January 2008. Thereafter, Tata Teleservices sold 26 percent of its shares to NTT DOCOMO of Japan for Rs. 13,230 crore. Thus, the DoT had undervalued spectrum by between seven and 10 times its true market worth.

    This became even more evident in 2010 when the government was able to raise more than Rs. 1,11,500 crore through public auction of third generation (3G) spectrum. Raja claimed 2G spectrum and 3G spectrum were not comparable just as basmati rice was not comparable to rice from the PDS (public distribution system). This argument is fallacious in the context of valuation of spectrum for a simple reason: the spectrum used is the same; only the nature of services provided is different by deploying superior technology — in other words, the same spectrum can be, and is, used to provide faster data transfer and other mobile telecom services.

    The CAG found that 13 companies that had received 85 out of the 122 new licences issued in 2008 did not satisfy the DoT eligibility conditions. The companies did not have the stipulated paid-up capital at the time of application and 45 out of these 85 licences were issued to companies which failed to satisfy the condition that providing telecom services should be the main object clause in their memoranda and articles of association.

    Crossed lines (from left): Since 1999, Ram Vilas Paswan, Pramod Mahajan, Arun Shourie, Dayanidhi Maran, A Raja and Kapil Sibal have helmed the telecom ministry
    Crossed lines (from left): Since 1999, Ram Vilas Paswan, Pramod Mahajan, Arun Shourie, Dayanidhi Maran, A Raja and Kapil Sibal have helmed the telecom ministry

    The CAG also pointed out that spectrum was provided beyond the contracted 6.2 megahertz (MHZ) to nine existing operators in 2007 despite a number of applications pending for new licences. These were Aircel, Bharti, BPL (Mumbai), the public sector undertakings Bharat Sanchar Nigam Ltd (BSNL) and Mahanagar Telephone Nigam Ltd (MTNL), Idea, Reliance, Spice (Punjab) and Vodafone.

    The biggest beneficiary of additional spectrum was BSNL (61.6 MHZ in 19 telecom circles) followed by Bharti (32.4 MHZ in 13 circles), Vodafone (19.6 MHZ in seven circles), Idea (12.6 MHZ in six circles), MTNL (124 MHZ in Delhi and Mumbai circles) and others. The total loss to the exchequer on account of allocation of additional spectrum at low prices: Rs. 36,993 crore.

    In January 2008, when the DoT issued all-India licences at Rs. 1,658 crore, the price was the same as that which had existed in 2001. The CAG used two parameters for assessing the possible “presumptive” or “notional” loss which the exchequer has suffered. In November 2007, S Tel had written first to the PM and later to Raja offering to pay Rs. 13,752 crore over 10 years for allotment of 6.2 MHZ of GSM spectrum.

    The CAG took this figure as a benchmark and calculated that the government would have generated revenue of 67,364 crore by selling 122 licences, 35 licences under the dual-technology regime and excess spectrum beyond the contracted amount of 6.2 MHZ.

    Further, after taking into account the revenue that was generated after the 3G auction, the price of spectrum for the 122 licences issued can be established at Rs. 1,11,512 crore against the Rs. 9,014 crore that the government actually earned. In addition, Rs. 40,526 crore would have been generated by selling 35 licences under the dual-use category and Rs. 13,841 crore for excess spectrum. Hence, the CAG report estimated the total loss to the exchequer, based on the 3G auctions, at Rs. 1,76,645 crore.

    http://www.tehelka.com/story_main48.asp?filename=Ne010111THEABCOF.asp


  • No Technology for tracking live 3G Data !

    What’s That again? Technology not available?

    Pass on some percentage of profit you earned by the largesse of Raja.

    In fact this would be a fraction of what has been paid to ,to whom, you know who I mean.

    Now Radia is out of the loop, you have to organise something else.

    NEW DELHI: The government will prevent telcos from offering non-voice 3G mobile services in seven days, unless they demonstrate that these facilities can be tapped live, a senior department of telecom (DoT) official said.

    The 3G data services that could be impacted include high-speed internet, download of music and video clips, chat and internet telephony calls. So far, state-run telcos BSNL and MTNL and private players such as Reliance Communications (RCOM) and Tata Teleservices have launched 3G — high-end data services on mobiles — while Bharti Airtel was slated to begin offering them by the year-end.

    DoT last week halted video-calling services citing security concerns at the home ministry’s behest, as these can be traced only a few minutes after they have ended. While intelligence agencies complain that such calls cannot be monitored live, executives with telcos say there is no technology available globally for real-time tapping of video calls.

    During a meeting on Monday among representatives of telcos, the home ministry and security agencies, the Intelligence Bureau had sought a temporary ban on all 3G data services, a DoT official present said.

    First-mover advantage lost
    But, operators have been given up to seven days to demonstrate that data services can be tapped in real time, failing which the services will be disallowed. IB officials too have said they will discuss internally some of the proposals suggested by telcos during Monday’s meeting, and come back within the next couple of days, this official added.

    Any temporary ban on 3G services will dent the firstmover advantage enjoyed by RCOM, Tata Teleservices, and the state-run companies. It might also force Bharti Airtel, Vodafone, Idea Cellular, and Aircel to delay their launch plans.

    Read more: Security concerns ‘derail’ 3G – The Times of India http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-industry/telecom/telcos-face-3g-ban-failing-real-time-test-/articleshow/7136202.cms#ixzz18oZDqRiw
    Related:

    Real-time HRV monitoring system

    The HRV Live! uses cutting edge technology to give you the ability to measure parasympathetic and sympathetic activities and assess the autonomic balance in the body. It allows for design of the HRV evaluation protocols of any length to accommodate to any research or assessment needs. When monitoring, HRV Live! performs a full HRV analysis of the last 5 minutes of data and updates live displays every half a second. 

    HRV Live! provides a detailed analysis of recorded HRV data to show full dynamics of changes in the regulatory tonus of both the parasympathetic and sympathetic nervous systems and autonomic balance over a prolonged period of time.
    Normative DB included
    Normative database included
    Software provides analysis of HRV assessment results based on a large population normative database.
    HRV Live! provides the means for continuous real-time monitoring and recording of the autonomic nervous system’s regulatory function. It is based on the standard short-term HRV analysis of heart rate (HR) data obtained from either an ECG recorder or a pulse wave sensor. HRV Live! provides detailed analysis of the recorded HRV data. The HRV Live! shows the full dynamics of change in the regulatory tonus of both the sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous systems and autonomic balance over a prolonged period of time.

    MAY 11, 2010 – Splunk, the IT Search company, has announced the availability of Splunk 4.1 at its inaugural SplunkLive! customer events in Singapore and Hong Kong, following a successful first full year of local operations which saw customer numbers top 170 in the Asia-Pacific region.

    Since establishing regional headquarters in Hong Kong in late 2008, Splunk’s Asia-Pacific presence has more than doubled in size. Splunk now has staff based in Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan and Australia, with plans to establish a local presence in additional Asia-Pacific countries in 2010, says Robert Lau, Vice President, Asia Pacific and Japan for Splunk.

    “Despite the macro-economic climate, 2009 was a very good year for Splunk,” said Mr Lau. “The company experienced worldwide growth over 100% and Asia-Pacific represents the fastest growing region in the world. As more and more Asia-Pac customers experience the value of Splunk we look to continue this in 2010 and also expand our partner network to meet the demand.”

    Leading Asia-Pacific organizations now using Splunk include: Nanyang Technological University in Singapore, Merck Singapore, Aviva Asia, Singapore National Institute of Education, Infocomm Asia Holdings, UIH i-Secure, Telkomsel Indonesia, Fortis Insurance, Daiwa Securities, Lenovo China, Ernst & Young India, Taiwan National Center for High-Performance Computing, Taiwan Stock Exchange, Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan Mobile, NTT Data, Singtel Optus, Telstra, Ericsson Australia, Monash University, Raytheon Australia and Lloyds International.

    Splunk 4.1 provides the unique ability for users to search, monitor and analyze live streaming IT data as well as terabytes of historical data, all from the same interface, delivering the best of both worlds for IT data management. The ability to search, analyze and create live dashboards with streaming data from the IT infrastructure delivers immediate visibility to operational, application, security and compliance issues. Now users can see incidents and attacks as they occur, monitor application SLAs in real time, correlate and analyze events on streaming data and track live transactions and online activity.

    http://www.splunk.com/view/SP-CAAAFMX