Tag: Government of India

  • 2G Corrupt money takes 558Years to Distribute.

    Those in India know the sum involved in 2G scam is Rs.1,76,ooo Crores or Rs.1,76,000,00,00,000( for details of the scam refer blogs under Corruption/India).

    How huge the amount is?


    Let us assume you want to donate this money at the rate of Rs one hundred per head( one note).

    Ask the people to come in queue.

    You can give it to 1760 Crore people.

    That means you can disperse the money to ALL the people on earth and  provide the same  to people of Three Earths.(my maths Correct?)

    (present population 
    Earth’s present human population is over 6,200 million.”

    http://www.booksaboutthefuture.com/population-statistics.htm)

    If you disperse it to people coming in queue ,it will take 558 yeas(one second per recipient).

    If you stack the hundred Rupee note one upon another, t will reach a height of 1760 kms(Mount Everest 29,028feet; one bundle one cm height)

    If you stack the amount in suit cases,,3,00,000 lakh suit cases are needed.

    (Suit case size 2×11/2×1)

    Source: Thughlak.



  • One lakh Telephone lines Tapped per Year in India.Tapping Law…

    Telephone recording laws are laws that govern the civilian recording of telephone conversations by the participants (as opposed to laws controlling government or law enforcement wiretapping).

    Telephone tapping is officially strictly controlled in many countries to safeguard an individual’s privacy; this is the case in all developeddemocracies. In theory, telephone tapping often needs to be authorised by a court, and is, again in theory, normally only approved whenevidence shows it is not possible to detect criminal or subversive activity in less intrusive ways; often the law and regulations require that the crime investigated must be at least of a certain severity. In many jurisdictions however, permission for telephone tapping is easily obtained on a routine basis without further investigation by the court or other entity granting such permission. Illegal or unauthorised telephone tapping is often a criminal offence. However, in certain jurisdictions such as Germany, courts will accept illegally recorded phone calls without the other party’s consent as evidence.

    In India, telephone tapping has to be approved by a designated authority. It is illegal otherwise. [4]

    The Central Government or State Government is empowered to order interception of messages per section 5 of Indian Telegraph Act 1885 [5]. Rule 419 and 419A sets out the procedure of interception and monitoring of telephone messages. There is a provision for a review committee to supervise the order of interception. Phone tapping is permitted based on Court order only and such permission is granted only if it is required to prevent a major offence involving national security or to gather intelligence on anti-national/terrorist activities. Though economic offences/tax evasion were initially covered under the reasons for interception of phones, the same was withdrawn in 1999 by the Government based on a Supreme Court order citing protection to privacy of the individual.

    As per Rule 428 of the India telegraphic rules, no person without the sanction of the telegraph authority, use any telephone or cause or suffer it to be used, purposes other than the establishment of local or trunk calls.

    The Government of India instructions provide for approved attachments. There is no provision for attachment for recording conversation.

    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Telephone_recording_laws

    Some startling figures tumbled out on rampant phone tapping in the country when telecom service provider Reliance Communications told the Supreme Court on Monday that the authorities had asked it to tap 1.51 lakh phone numbers in a five-year span between 2006 and 2010.

    This works out to an average of over 30,000 telephone interceptions every year by a single service provider on the orders of various law enforcing agencies. Or, over 82 telephones were intercepted every day by a single service provider.

    Reliance is the second-largest service provider with a subscriber base of 12.57 crore as in 2010. The biggest service provider, Bharti Airtel, had 15.25 crore subscribers in 2010, while Vodafone’s subscriber base was just a shade lower than Reliance’s at 12.43 crore. State-owned BSNL came fourth with 8.67 crore subscribers.

    If Reliance’s ratio of phones tapped to the number of its subscribers were to be taken as representative and applied to other service providers, it is a fair assumption that government agencies were tapping more than one lakh phones every year.

    In Delhi alone, Reliance tapped a total of 3,588 phones in 2005 when the teledensity was low compared to today. It also included Amar Singh’s number which was put under surveillance —

    Over 1 lakh phones are tapped every year – The Times of India http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Over-1-lakh-phones-are-tapped-every-year/articleshow/7498154.cms#ixzz1E1w6e8Lc

     

     

     

  • Mumbai Attack-Pak. has no control-Wiki leaks.3/3.

    Flag of the Pakistan Army
    Image via Wikipedia

     

    ¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke on February 16, Menon:

    — stated that India “has a huge stake” in the Special Representative’s success in his new role and promised to support Holbrooke’s efforts publicly to alleviate negative media speculation about the Special Representative’s mandate; — gave his assessment that the intentions and capabilities of the Pakistan Army were the key determinants of Pakistan,s internal situation and the cause of friction between India and Pakistan; — said that India wishes to collaborate closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan, and offered support for U.S. views on the suitability of an August 20 election date; — suggested that after consulting internally, he may travel to Washington to provide GOI input into the U.S. review of Afghanistan policy; and — provided a brief on the GOI’s initial reaction to Pakistan’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks. End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, accompanied by Ambassador, met February 16 with Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon. Also in attendance from the U.S. side were Paul Jones, Deputy for Holbrooke; Ashley Bommer, Representative Holbrooke’s assistant; and an Embassy notetaker; the Indian side also included Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar and Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) TCA Raghvan. Holbrooke explained his responsibilities as Special Representative and emphasized the importance of Indian views in the formulation of the new administration,s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. He also provided Menon with a brief readout of his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan

    ¶3. (C) Menon cited the numerous times he had worked both publicly and privately with Holbrooke in the past, and said he was very happy to see Holbrooke in his new incarnation. The Indian government, too, was pleased with Holbrooke’s appointment, he stated, adding “We have a huge stake in your success in this role.” He agreed with Holbrooke’s assessment that in regard to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan “you can’t solve one without the other.”

    ¶4. (C) The Indian government was aware of the suspicions the media had created about Special Representative Holbrooke’s mandate (i.e., that it included Kashmir), Menon said. While the media would always speculate, Menon promised that the GOI would publicly support Holbrooke’s efforts, adding that it would repeat the message “India has a huge stake in your success” in its public comments.

    ¶5. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a civilian government to worries over security and the economy. The U.S. has influence, however, “where it matters most,” Menon said, referring to the Pakistan Army, arguing that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan’s military. Not only must Pakistan’s army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut its links to jihadi organizations, who have gone global over the past five years. Supporting Pakistan’s army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that changing its operating assumptions would be more effective. Menon noted that the Indians had felt last week’s meeting at the Munich Security Conference between National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and General Petraeus had been especially productive.

    ¶6. (C) Menon pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilize Pakistan’s civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and travel relations. However, Pakistan’s Army continued to make things difficult for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for terrorist groups.

    NEW DELHI 00000288 002 OF 002

    Menon noted that India, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, had consciously not built up troops on the border with Pakistan, as it had following the 2001 attack on its Parliament.

    ¶7. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Holbrooke noted that the focus now was on the elections. He lauded India for the effective contribution it had made to Afghanistan reconstruction, which Menon said is now up to $1.5 billion. Menon acknowledged Pakistani suspicions about India,s intentions in Afghanistan and explained that India has made numerous efforts over the past few years to try to allay Pakistan’s concerns, only to be rebuffed. Menon said that he, as High Commissioner, had offered to President Musharraf to sit down and explain exactly what India was doing in Afghanistan, without even asking for a reciprocal explanation from Pakistan, but that Pakistan officials — not just Musharraf — “have avoided it in every way.”

    ¶8. (C) India has no interest in any specific candidate in Afghan elections, Menon stated, but believes the upcoming election process should not add to instability. Equally important is that the election process is credible, therefore making Afghanistan’s democracy credible. Menon noted that Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni was currently in Delhi, and said India supported the Election Commission,s proposal for August 20 polling. Menon stated that the GOI was also planning to tell Qanuni that controversy over the exact date of the election should not be allowed “to bring the house down,” adding that to do so would only be in the Taliban’s interest. Holbrooke urged Menon to tell Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. (Note: Menon offered to brief Post on the Qunani meeting, and Post will report septel on any readout provided. End Note.)

    ¶9. (C) Responding to Holbrooke,s brief of the Afghanistan policy review currently underway in the USG, Menon said he would consult with his government on what would be the best way for India to provide input. He suggested that, after consultations, he would like to travel to Washington for high level talks with the new team. Menon assured Holbrooke, that on the issue of Indian cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan, we could be assured that India wished to work closely with us.

    ¶10. (C) Menon asked if the U.S. was considering including Iran in a Core Group on Afghanistan. Holbrooke referred to his interview with Tolo TV where he emphasized the need for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors to be part of the solution, but said no policy decisions had been made. Menon said he believed a contact group did not have to be formally set up yet, but rather if we “let it cook,” it would form itself. Menon noted the interest China has had in such a group for the past two years, and added that Iran has been signaling to India for the last four months that it was interested.

    ¶11. (C) Menon offered an initial GOI assessment of the Pakistani response to India’s dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks. Saying that it was “remarkable that we got this far,” Menon thanked the U.S. for its role in pressing Pakistan to act. Still, Menon maintained, Pakistan has further to go to bring justice to the perpetrators of the attack, and it is not clear whether Pakistan will continue on this positive track or, citing the Daniel Pearl case, recede when public pressure wanes. Menon also speculated that many of the “30 questions” submitted by Pakistan were added after the investigation by politicians in response to domestic pressures. “We haven’t reached the point of no return yet” for Pakistan’s government to positively conclude the investigation, Menon stated. Menon also offered that he did not believe the Mumbai attacks themselves would play a major role in India’s upcoming elections, because efforts to capitalize politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any political party.

    ¶12. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. MULFORD

     

  • Mumbai Attack-Pak. has no control over ISI-US,Wiki leaks 2/3.

    Flag of Indian Army
    Image via Wikipedia

     

    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrineâ€
    is a
    mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use
    on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints,
    but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended
    to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a
    crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation
    of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited
    penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing
    Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in
    India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a
    nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the
    government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold
    Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future
    implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start
    given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment
    of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to
    implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-
    linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of
    the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice.
    At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and
    may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these

    factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in
    the plan’s existence than in any real world application. End Summary.

    What It Is and What It Is Not

    —————————–

    ¶2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised
    by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration
    into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over
    some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without
    threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear
    response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or
    occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the
    Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal
    2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy
    process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility,
    and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from
    Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners
    to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start’s
    genesis).

    ¶3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military
    mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold
    Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been
    given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward
    positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed
    and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry
    would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance
    and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant
    air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel
    planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for
    the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further
    analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).

    ¶4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is
    that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield

    the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action
    against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the
    international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty
    of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if
    the plan is never actually implemented — and there is considerable question
    as to GOI intent to ever implement it — news of Cold Start’s existence
    has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance
    to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for
    attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear
    destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the
    added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in
    theory may have some deterrent value.

    Prospects for Cold Start

    ————————

    ¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start
    is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in
    April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by
    the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold
    Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is
    with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-
    making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a
    factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as
    a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn
    could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-
    making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an
    incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military
    action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on
    Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the
    military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc
    nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and
    the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not
    clearly understood.

    ¶6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian
    military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that
    India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could
    have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical
    difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various

    resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range
    from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold
    Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large
    number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not
    have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani
    Punjab and Sindh.

    ¶7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is
    designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear
    response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain
    from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response,
    GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan
    will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a
    resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys
    in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.

    Comment

    ——-

    ¶8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in
    Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani
    thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start
    even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which
    calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt the
    Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since
    2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent
    terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled.
    This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani
    mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of
    sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders
    to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after
    a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public
    response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all
    or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several
    very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about
    their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported,
    or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National
    Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the
    army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is
    less clear. ROEMER

  • Probe DMK,LTTE Tamil Separatist angle.

    http://www.in.com/videos/watchvideo-2g-spectrum-scam-cbi-raids-a-rajas-residences-9748943.html

    Todays raids by CBI and ED in the houses of A.Raja,ex.telecom minister,his siblings,Kanimozhi MP,daughter of Karunanidhi,Karananidhi’s consort and mother of Kanimozhi, Rasathi’s auditor and a journalist Kamaraj is note worthy.

    Kamaraj, journalist in Nakkeran group of Nakkeran Gopal who helped(?) negotiate the release of Dr.Rajkumar who was abducted by brigand Veerappan, is known to be a LTTE and Tamil separatist

    sympathizer along with Gopal.

    Raid in the office of Tamizh Maiyam,a NGO of which Kanimozhi is a Trustee has to be noted as Jegath Gasper who is running the organisation is a known LTTE supportter and interlocutor of separatists.

    Keep this in mind with the raid on Hawala brokers,you come to the conclusion whether the 2G scam may in fact have a bearing on terrorist link.

    Now Center has received LTTE threat on the life of PM.

    Something sinister seems to be afoot.

    Imperative that security agencies take immediate action.

    Related.

    English translation of Dinamani editorial follows:

    After the war it waged against the Liberation Tigers Sri Lanka government had forgotten them and is preoccupied with other matters. But the Government of India continues to impose its ban on Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) claiming it as a ‘terrorist’ movement. It is but reasonable to question whether its decision to continue the ban is justified.

    “There has been no attacks (by LTTE) after Sri Lanka Army had announced its victory in the war against LTTE. Considering this and the fact that the LTTE is in a very weak position it appears that though the LTTE regroups to function again it is more likely for its struggle to take the form of political struggle. It is also evident that an armed struggle is not possible immediately.

    Even now, all the legal actions pursued against LTTE internationally in countries like Malaysia, USA and Australia for illegal purchase of weapons, pertain to their activities prior to the war and not after it.

    In this context, even if the Government of India had voluntarily withdrawn the ban there would not have been any objection to it. But the judge presiding over the last three debating sessions of the Special Tribunal, headed by a High Court Justice to examine the legality of extension of ban on Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), surprisingly, had said that it is the Liberation Tigers who should present their case as the party affected by the ban.

    So long as the ban remains it would be legally right for the Indian Government to arrest those entering India claiming to be LTTE persons and hand them over to Sri Lanka government. In which case how could the Liberation Tigers appear before the Special Tribune in India?

    If they are expected to appear before the Special Tribune those LTTE persons should not be arrested but be allowed to go to countries they wish. How could they appear without the guarantee of their safe return, from the Indian Government?

    Interior Security Department Director P. K. Misra of the Indian Central government Home Ministry had argued that the ban on LTTE should not be lifted, in the third session of the Special Tribunal held in Uthakai. He had placed two reasons in support of his argument. Firstly, there are supporters of LTTE who create problems which threaten the sovereignty of India. Secondly, 115 persons who are members of the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam have relations with LTTE and some of these members have connections to Maoists in India.

    One should view his argument in the light of two facts. Firstly, the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam is not banned in any international country. Secondly, one should only consider the political situation after the end of the Eelam War. It would not be wise to take into account the situation before that war.

    The only people to contradict the arguments of the Director of Interior Security Department and to present reasons for the demand to lift the ban are the strong political parties in India. Only their voice has the power to reach the ears of the Indian Central Government. But they chose to remain silent as if they have nothing to do with the issue; it shows their lack of love for the Tamil people.

    The General Secretary of Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhakam, Vaiko and the leader of Tamil Nationalist Movement Pazha Nedumaran had courted imprisonment for supporting LTTE in Tamil Nadu. Why should not their views on this issue be recorded as the views of the LTTE? After all they had openly supported the LTTE.

    Even if it might be true that some of the LTTE members may have had relations with the Maoists that could only be the remnants of earlier links. There is no possibility of fresh relationship given the present situation in Ilangkai.

    Either the ban on LTTE should be lifted and they be allowed to place their arguments or LTTE supporters be allowed to represent them. If this cannot be done the Special Tribunal and its sessions are meaningless.

    One could even appreciate the justice of Sri Lanka Rajapaksa government which had forgotten the LTTE but it is impossible to understand the justice of Indian Government.”

    http://www.tamilnet.com/art.html?catid=13&artid=32865