Tag: Wikileaks india

  • Mumbai Attack-Pak. has no control-Wiki leaks.3/3.

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    ¶1. (C) Summary. In a meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon and Special Representative Richard Holbrooke on February 16, Menon:

    — stated that India “has a huge stake” in the Special Representative’s success in his new role and promised to support Holbrooke’s efforts publicly to alleviate negative media speculation about the Special Representative’s mandate; — gave his assessment that the intentions and capabilities of the Pakistan Army were the key determinants of Pakistan,s internal situation and the cause of friction between India and Pakistan; — said that India wishes to collaborate closely with the U.S. on Afghanistan, and offered support for U.S. views on the suitability of an August 20 election date; — suggested that after consulting internally, he may travel to Washington to provide GOI input into the U.S. review of Afghanistan policy; and — provided a brief on the GOI’s initial reaction to Pakistan’s response to the Mumbai terror attacks. End Summary.

    ¶2. (C) Special Representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke, accompanied by Ambassador, met February 16 with Indian Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon. Also in attendance from the U.S. side were Paul Jones, Deputy for Holbrooke; Ashley Bommer, Representative Holbrooke’s assistant; and an Embassy notetaker; the Indian side also included Joint Secretary (Americas) Gaitri Kumar and Joint Secretary (Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran) TCA Raghvan. Holbrooke explained his responsibilities as Special Representative and emphasized the importance of Indian views in the formulation of the new administration,s Afghanistan and Pakistan policy. He also provided Menon with a brief readout of his trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan

    ¶3. (C) Menon cited the numerous times he had worked both publicly and privately with Holbrooke in the past, and said he was very happy to see Holbrooke in his new incarnation. The Indian government, too, was pleased with Holbrooke’s appointment, he stated, adding “We have a huge stake in your success in this role.” He agreed with Holbrooke’s assessment that in regard to the problems in Afghanistan and Pakistan “you can’t solve one without the other.”

    ¶4. (C) The Indian government was aware of the suspicions the media had created about Special Representative Holbrooke’s mandate (i.e., that it included Kashmir), Menon said. While the media would always speculate, Menon promised that the GOI would publicly support Holbrooke’s efforts, adding that it would repeat the message “India has a huge stake in your success” in its public comments.

    ¶5. (C) Turning to Pakistan, Menon observed that the mood there had deteriorated over the past year, saying it had gone from euphoria after the return of a civilian government to worries over security and the economy. The U.S. has influence, however, “where it matters most,” Menon said, referring to the Pakistan Army, arguing that most of the problems in Pakistan can be traced to the capacity and intentions of Pakistan’s military. Not only must Pakistan’s army shift its attention from east to west, Menon asserted, but it must also cut its links to jihadi organizations, who have gone global over the past five years. Supporting Pakistan’s army is not the answer, he said, suggesting that changing its operating assumptions would be more effective. Menon noted that the Indians had felt last week’s meeting at the Munich Security Conference between National Security Advisor MK Narayanan and General Petraeus had been especially productive.

    ¶6. (C) Menon pointed out that in the wake of the Mumbai terrorist attacks, India had consciously not attempted to take any measures to destabilize Pakistan’s civilian government, and had made every effort to continue trade and travel relations. However, Pakistan’s Army continued to make things difficult for India, through ceasefire violations, infiltrations and continued support for terrorist groups.

    NEW DELHI 00000288 002 OF 002

    Menon noted that India, in the wake of the Mumbai attacks, had consciously not built up troops on the border with Pakistan, as it had following the 2001 attack on its Parliament.

    ¶7. (C) Turning to Afghanistan, Holbrooke noted that the focus now was on the elections. He lauded India for the effective contribution it had made to Afghanistan reconstruction, which Menon said is now up to $1.5 billion. Menon acknowledged Pakistani suspicions about India,s intentions in Afghanistan and explained that India has made numerous efforts over the past few years to try to allay Pakistan’s concerns, only to be rebuffed. Menon said that he, as High Commissioner, had offered to President Musharraf to sit down and explain exactly what India was doing in Afghanistan, without even asking for a reciprocal explanation from Pakistan, but that Pakistan officials — not just Musharraf — “have avoided it in every way.”

    ¶8. (C) India has no interest in any specific candidate in Afghan elections, Menon stated, but believes the upcoming election process should not add to instability. Equally important is that the election process is credible, therefore making Afghanistan’s democracy credible. Menon noted that Afghan Lower House Speaker Mohammad Yunis Qanuni was currently in Delhi, and said India supported the Election Commission,s proposal for August 20 polling. Menon stated that the GOI was also planning to tell Qanuni that controversy over the exact date of the election should not be allowed “to bring the house down,” adding that to do so would only be in the Taliban’s interest. Holbrooke urged Menon to tell Qanuni to accept the August 20 election date. (Note: Menon offered to brief Post on the Qunani meeting, and Post will report septel on any readout provided. End Note.)

    ¶9. (C) Responding to Holbrooke,s brief of the Afghanistan policy review currently underway in the USG, Menon said he would consult with his government on what would be the best way for India to provide input. He suggested that, after consultations, he would like to travel to Washington for high level talks with the new team. Menon assured Holbrooke, that on the issue of Indian cooperation with the U.S. on Afghanistan, we could be assured that India wished to work closely with us.

    ¶10. (C) Menon asked if the U.S. was considering including Iran in a Core Group on Afghanistan. Holbrooke referred to his interview with Tolo TV where he emphasized the need for all of Afghanistan’s neighbors to be part of the solution, but said no policy decisions had been made. Menon said he believed a contact group did not have to be formally set up yet, but rather if we “let it cook,” it would form itself. Menon noted the interest China has had in such a group for the past two years, and added that Iran has been signaling to India for the last four months that it was interested.

    ¶11. (C) Menon offered an initial GOI assessment of the Pakistani response to India’s dossier on the Mumbai terror attacks. Saying that it was “remarkable that we got this far,” Menon thanked the U.S. for its role in pressing Pakistan to act. Still, Menon maintained, Pakistan has further to go to bring justice to the perpetrators of the attack, and it is not clear whether Pakistan will continue on this positive track or, citing the Daniel Pearl case, recede when public pressure wanes. Menon also speculated that many of the “30 questions” submitted by Pakistan were added after the investigation by politicians in response to domestic pressures. “We haven’t reached the point of no return yet” for Pakistan’s government to positively conclude the investigation, Menon stated. Menon also offered that he did not believe the Mumbai attacks themselves would play a major role in India’s upcoming elections, because efforts to capitalize politically on such a heinous event would likely backfire on any political party.

    ¶12. (SBU) Ambassador Holbrooke has cleared this message. MULFORD

     

  • Mumbai Attack-Pak. has no control over ISI-US,Wiki leaks 2/3.

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    ¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrineâ€
    is a
    mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use
    on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints,
    but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended
    to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a
    crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation
    of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited
    penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing
    Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in
    India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a
    nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the
    government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold
    Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future
    implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start
    given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment
    of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to
    implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-
    linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of
    the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice.
    At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and
    may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these

    factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in
    the plan’s existence than in any real world application. End Summary.

    What It Is and What It Is Not

    —————————–

    ¶2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised
    by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration
    into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over
    some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without
    threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear
    response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or
    occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the
    Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal
    2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy
    process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility,
    and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from
    Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners
    to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start’s
    genesis).

    ¶3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military
    mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold
    Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been
    given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward
    positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed
    and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry
    would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance
    and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant
    air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel
    planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for
    the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further
    analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).

    ¶4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is
    that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield

    the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action
    against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the
    international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty
    of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if
    the plan is never actually implemented — and there is considerable question
    as to GOI intent to ever implement it — news of Cold Start’s existence
    has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance
    to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for
    attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear
    destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the
    added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in
    theory may have some deterrent value.

    Prospects for Cold Start

    ————————

    ¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start
    is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in
    April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by
    the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold
    Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is
    with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-
    making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a
    factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as
    a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn
    could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-
    making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an
    incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military
    action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on
    Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the
    military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc
    nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and
    the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not
    clearly understood.

    ¶6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian
    military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that
    India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could
    have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical
    difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various

    resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range
    from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold
    Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large
    number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not
    have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani
    Punjab and Sindh.

    ¶7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is
    designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear
    response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain
    from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response,
    GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan
    will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a
    resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys
    in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.

    Comment

    ——-

    ¶8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in
    Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani
    thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start
    even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which
    calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt the
    Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since
    2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent
    terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled.
    This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani
    mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of
    sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders
    to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after
    a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public
    response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all
    or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several
    very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about
    their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported,
    or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National
    Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the
    army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is
    less clear. ROEMER