“In a note that Italian prosecutors have produced in court to allege the vital role played by middleman Christian Michel in fixing the VVIP chopper deal, the British ‘consultant’ has told top AgustaWestland officials to ‘target’ the closest advisers for UPA chairperson Sonia Gandhi for the contract.
The March 2008 note, which has been sent by the elusive Christian Michel to Peter Hulett, the then Head of Region, Govt Sales at the AgustaWestland India office, is one of the many documents that Italian investigators seized from the office of Switzerland based middleman Guido Haschke who is currently facing trial in the case of alleged 51 million euro kickbacks generated in the Indian VVIP chopper deal.
India has in January terminated the deal on the grounds that the integrity pact was violated and that unfair practices were adopted to bag the deal by Agusta. The Defence Ministry is currently engaged in an arbitration process on the contract that was inked in 2010. The March 15, 2008 note that has been produced in Italian court is addressed to Peter and instructs him to advise the British High Commissioner in India (AgustaWestland is an Anglo-Italian firm) to ‘target’ people close to Sonia Gandhi.
“As Mrs Gandhi is the driving force behind the VIP, she will not fly any more in the Mi 8. Mrs Gandhi and her closest advisers are the people the High Commissioner should target,” the note reads. Mi 8′s are the current VIP role choppers flown by the air force. The document has been produced by prosecutors as part of their questioning of Guido Haschke. In January, as reported by The Indian Express, they also asked Haschke in court if the reference to an abbreviation of AP in a ‘budget sheet’ of the middlemen referred to Gandhi’s key aide Ahmed Patel. Italian newspaper Il Fatto Quotidiano has also reported that the prosecutors produced a photograph of Sonia Gandhi and Ahmed Patel during the hearing to question Haschke but the middlemen said that he only recognised Gandhi from the picture.”
First he raised his age issue , where it was evident to every one he was not honest, to say the least.
He produced two dates of Births,1950 and 1951.
He accepted all the promotions due to him based on 1950 DOB and when the retirement issue came up, he started saying that his DOB was 1951 and even went to the extent of filing a case in the Supreme Court against the Government.
Unlike him, the Court had the sense to have the matter sorted out out side the Court as it does not augur well for the Country Defence Chief and The Government fighting in Public and VK Singh did abide by the Defence Ministry’s DOB of 1950.
Now he has disclosed in an interview in The Hindu that he was offered a bribe of Rs. 14 Crore for favouring Tatra Trucks and that he had informed the Defence Ministry of this affair -Mind you,the did not make this revelation to his Supreme Commander,The President of India -he announced it in an interview to a National Newspaper!
Not content with this, may be connected with this issue, a letter from VK Singh to The Prime Minister surfaced about the lack of equipments to the Army and the general preparedness of The Indian Armed Forces.
1.If the complaint is true why did not VK Singh record this in writing to the Defence Minister( who has stated that he received the complaint some time back)?
In fact KK Singh seems to have been requested to do so by the Defence Minister A.K.Antony.
2.Why did VK Singh, through the Army Head quarters recommend an Army Officer -not Tejinder Singh ,for promotion about whom he raised corruption issues?
3.The Army has been using Tatra Trucks for nearly 30 Years.
Why VK Singh did not raise this issue till the date of his retirement?
Now he orders a CBI enquiry, which again is not his powers to do so.
He could have raised it when he was a Senior Officer or at least after he became the Army Chief.
VK Singh now declares that he has no issues with the Defence Ministry.
He adds that the Army Chief is a part of the Government, he has no issues with the Defence Ministry, the release of the letter addressed to the PM is ‘high treason’ and he has no hand in the letter becoming Public!
Does he believe in what he says?
As per procedure he should have addressed the letter to the Defence Minister or in the worst case should have addressed the Supreme Commander,The President of India.
PM does not enter the picture direct.
Now Tatra CMD has refuted his allegation in toto saying that only the Technologyis provided by Tatra and the Trucks are, are manufactured with 40 % Foreign Components and sold by BEML ,their Agent in India.
BEML is the nodal agency for Defence procurement.
The man accused by VK Singh ,Tejinder Singh has filed a defamation suit against VK Singh.
As I blogged earlier it is time VK Singh is sacked and stripped of his decorations.
VK Singh is not honest in stopping the corruption and is using this as an issue to win sympathy and gain popularity as an Honest Man after he had been proved to be less than honest in DOB affair.
However this does not mean that there is no Corruption in The Army in Procurement.
This has to be investigated and stopped.
I shall blog on How a Defence order is secured.
Tatra Truck
“The CBI on Friday registered a case into Army chief Gen V K Singh‘s Rs 14-crore bribery offer into the alleged irregularities in the supply of the all-terrain, all-weather Tatra trucksto the Army through defence PSU BEML after 1997.
UK-based businessman Ravi K Rishi and his company Vectra has been named in the FIR. Rishi was questioned by the agency on Friday since he is currently in the national Capital for the ongoing ”DefExpo-2012′.
The agency will send a Letter Rogatory (LR) to the Czech Republic soon to get more information on the case that has been registered under Section 420 (cheating) and the Prevention of Corruption Act on the basis of a complaint from the defence ministry and independent sources.
The agency on Friday evening also received a reply from Gen V K Singh in which he reportedly told CBI officials that he was offered a bribe. “He has offered to provide more details soon but he did not mention the bribe amount,” said a senior CBI official.
Tatra Sipox (U.K.) Ltd, the company whose Tatra off-road vehicles are extensively used by the Army and is now in the eye of a storm over alleged bribery allegations, has written to the Defence Secretary seeking his sanction to take appropriate legal action against the Army Chief, General V.K. Singh, on grounds of “slander, libel and defamation.”
Though Gen. Singh, in an interview to The Hindu, had not mentioned by name either the Tatra vehicle, the name of the person who attempted to offer him a bribe of Rs. 14 crore to clear an order to buy 600 “substandard” vehicles, or the company the bribe giver represented, it has been widely assumed that the vehicle is Tatra, the official is Lt. Gen. (retd.) Tejinder Singh, and that he was doing so on behalf of Tatra Sipox. However, a press release issued by the Army did mention Lt. Gen. (retd.) Tejinder Singh’s name as the person who made the bribe offer to the Army Chief.
Lt. Gen. (retd.) Tejinder has since denied that he offered the Army Chief a bribe.
“UNFOUNDED ALLEGATIONS”
In a letter addressed to the Defence Secretary, Shashi Kant Sharma, Tatra Sipox claimed that Gen. Singh’s defamatory and “false and unfounded allegations” caused deep harm to Tatra’s reputation. The letter also states that Tatra, which supplies trucks to BEML under licence, has “no reason or occasion to have to approach Gen. V.K. Singh.”
In a sensational claim, Army Chief General VK Singh has alleged that he was offered a bribe of Rs 14 crore by an equipment lobbyist in order to have a tranche of 600 sub-standard vehicles of a particular make cleared for purchase. The Army Chief in an interview to ‘The Hindu’ also claimed that he was targeted on his date of birth because he had cracked down on corruption cases.
The army chief also said he discussed the issue with Defence Minister AK Antony .
The Army Chief said the incident took place several months ago when a retired officer came to him and told him the deal would get him a certain sum of money. The Army Chief said such incidents have taken place in the past as well and many senior officers of the Indian Army had made the deal.
VK Singh, in the interview, was quoted saying, “One of the men had the gumption to walk up to me and tell me that if I cleared the tranche, he would give me Rs 14 crore. He was offering a bribe to me, to the Army Chief. He told me that people had taken money before me and they will take money after me. I went straight to Mr. Antony and reported the matter. I told him, if you think I’m a misfit, I will walk out.â€
The Army Chief went on to add, “It was because I had cracked down on corruption that I was targeted on my date of birth. But things are fast unravelling and you will soon see the hand behind the drama. You will soon see who the sutradhar of the play is.â€
The Army Chief added that after the topic was broached he threw the officer in question out from his office and informed the Defence Minister about the incident.
The Chief of maintains that his date of birth is 1950,but was wrongly entered as 1951.
Based on his official records he is to retire in about four months from now.
This issue has been brewing for quite sometime now and the Government has discussed the issue with V.K.Singh and also had a series of deliberations with the law Ministry and Human Resources Ministry.
That was the last position that one heard of.
Now V.K.Singh has filed a petition in the Supreme Court of India against the Government reportedly asking the Government to confirm his year of birth as 1950 and not 1951.
This,in his petition is ‘to vindicate his name and honour and not for sticking on to this job’ and he was not interested in continuing beyond what has been calculated based on 1951 as his year of birth.( as reported by Times Now News Channel to-day)
If V.K.Singh is innocent and his record is clean he should never have suggested to the Government taking 1951 as his year of his birth.
Asking the Court to direct the Government on this issue to the effect that his year of birth is 1950 and in the same breath declaring that he would not continue beyond the time for retirement calculated on the basis of year of Birth as 1951”well..to think this man has been heading the Indian defence Forces…….!
If V.K.Singh were to be honest and conscientious he should have taken this issue long back and taken a decision on this long back.
If the Government was bent on accepting 1951 as his year of Birth,V.K.Singh should have resigned immediately to protect his ‘honour’.
The other important issue is the Discipline of the Armed Forces.
V.K. Singh has set a bad precedent by going to Supreme Court which would encourage every on the Armed forces to seek remedy real or imagined.
Discipline goes through the window.
If not for anything, V.K.Singh should be sacked for this act alone.
The law as to correction of birth dates profoundly stated by the Supreme Court in Union of India vs. Harnam Singh is:-
“The date of birth entered in the service records of a civil servant is, thus of utmost importance for the reason that the right to continue in service stands decided by its entry in the service record…….A Government servant who makes an application for correction of date of birth beyond the time, so fixed, therefore, cannot claim, as a matter of right, the correction of his date of birth even if he has good evidence to establish that the recorded date of birth is clearly erroneous.”
The rationale for this explained by the Supreme Court in Home Department vs. R.Kirubakaran is:-
“An application for correction of the date of birth should not be dealt with by the tribunal or the High Court keeping in view only the public servant concerned. It need not be pointed out that any such direction for correction of the date of birth of the public servant concerned has a chain reaction, inasmuch as others waiting for years, below him for their respective promotions are affected in this process. Some are likely to suffer irreparable injury… ⦠Before any such direction is issued, the court or the tribunal must be fully satisfied that there has been real injustice to the person concerned and his claim for correction of date of birth has been made in accordance with the procedure prescribed, and within the time fixed by any rule or order.”
In rejecting his request the Ministry of Defence appears to have acted as per the law governing the country. Undisputably General Singh has not suffered any injustice much less “real injustice” having been appointed Chief of the staff with a tenure of over two years.
Controversy
The government could not have ignored the fact that while seeking entry into the National Defence Academy, a highly respectable and professional organisation, the date of birth claimed was 10th May 1950 which was also carried on to the Army List published in 1974-75. It is absolutely unclear why and how a wrong birth date could have at all been given by the son of a serving Army Officer. Could it be a simple mistake or was it given to gain an undue advantage at that stage? If the latter is true, then the matter assumes a very different complexion. If the initial entry is a question mark then questions can also be raised about subsequent events in the long career. But it would be in the interests of all to bury the past as it is too difficult to decipher the reasons for giving a wrong birth date and even if one wants to go into it, it may produce unfortunate results.
The nation is not interested in all this. But to be fair to him, it must be said that the original matriculation certificate showing 1951 as the birth year was indeed sent to the authority though six years later in 1971. This is not to reflect on General Singh’s integrity, which is beyond doubt, but to put the point in correct perspective.
What does really go against him is the fact that though he cites documentary evidence to support his claim, he never seriously and much less legally challenged the authorities.
Perhaps, he thought it fit to let things rest for better reasons. The Rules require a claim for correction of birth date to be made within two years. True, some part of the record does mention 1951 as the birth year but then that is not conclusive as per the Rules.
This confusion is further compounded to the detriment of General Singh’s case since in 2008, well before his appointment as the Chief, he was indeed called upon to confirm 1950 as the birth year. It seems that on three occasions between January and July 2008 he accepted this position in writing. May be he did it in “organisational interest” or with “reservations” but once he accepted this position, in law he is estopped from contending otherwise. On moral grounds he is absolutely forbidden to argue to the contrary. The case of some of the commentators that he was “coerced” or “left with little choice” is, to say the least, a sad commentary on an officer expected to maintain absolute integrity and one who leads one of the finest military institutions in the world and perhaps does disservice to him too.
Solution
The attempt, by some sympathisers of General Singh, to have this issue resolved by the Supreme Court through a PIL is, to say the least, unfortunate. His own attempt to re-kindle this issue by purportedly meeting senior ministers, if true, is equally distasteful. Once he accepted the highest position that he could have aspired for, even with reservations, on the basis of the birth date recorded on the date of entry, he himself should have gracefully allowed the issue to rest in the larger interests of the Armed Forces and the Nation.
Any attempt, directly or indirectly, to keep the issue alive is clearly contrary to what the Supreme Court described, as the very soul of an Army: “High Morale” and “Strict Discipline” and may lead to “Chaos” and “Ruination”. General Singh, having a distinguished record, must himself put the debate to rest by declaring that he is no longer keen to have the date changed at this stage in the larger interests of the nation. Public interest will suffer irreparably unless this controversy is allowed to rest forthwith.
¶1. (S/NF) Summary: The Indian Army’s “Cold Start Doctrineâ€
is a
mixture of myth and reality. It has never been and may never be put to use
on a battlefield because of substantial and serious resource constraints,
but it is a developed operational attack plan announced in 2004 and intended
to be taken off the shelf and implemented within a 72-hour period during a
crisis. Cold Start is not a plan for a comprehensive invasion and occupation
of Pakistan. Instead, it calls for a rapid, time- and distance-limited
penetration into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing
Pakistan, possibly in response to a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in
India, without threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a
nuclear response. It was announced by the BJP-led government in 2004, but the
government of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has not publicly embraced Cold
Start and GOI uncertainty over Pakistani nuclear restraint may inhibit future
implementation by any government. If the GOI were to implement Cold Start
given present Indian military capabilities, it is the collective judgment
of the Mission that India would encounter mixed results. The GOI failed to
implement Cold Start in the wake of the audacious November 2008 Pakistan-
linked terror attack in Mumbai, which calls into question the willingness of
the GOI to implement Cold Start in any form and thus roll the nuclear dice.
At the same time, the existence of the plan reassures the Indian public and
may provide some limited deterrent effect on Pakistan. Taken together, these
factors underline that the value of the doctrine to the GOI may lie more in
the plan’s existence than in any real world application. End Summary.
What It Is and What It Is Not
—————————–
¶2. (S/NF) As we understand it, Cold Start is an operational plan devised
by the Indian Army and designed to make a rapid and limited penetration
into Pakistani territory with the goal of quickly punishing Pakistan over
some event, such as a Pakistan-linked terrorist attack in India, without
threatening the survival of the Pakistani state or provoking a nuclear
response. Cold Start is not a plan for the comprehensive invasion or
occupation of Pakistan. Cold Start is said to have been formulated after the
Indian Army’s slow and drawn-out 2002 mobilization in response to the fatal
2001 Pakistan-linked terror attack on the Indian Parliament. The lengthy
process of mobilization, lack of strategic and operational flexibility,
and the resulting lack of any element of surprise drew criticism from
Indian politicians and opinion leaders, which prompted Indian Army planners
to devise Cold Start. (See Reftel for further details on Cold Start’s
genesis).
¶3. (S/NF) In order to avoid the Indian Army’s slow and lumbering military
mobilization process and preserve the element of surprise in attack, Cold
Start attacks could begin within 72 hours after the attack order has been
given, and would be led by armored spearheads launched from prepared forward
positions in Punjab and Rajasthan. As described, the plan emphasizes speed
and overwhelming firepower: armored formations and accompanying infantry
would advance into eastern Pakistan with limited goals in terms of distance
and in terms of duration. Although the plan reportedly has a significant
air support component, it is unclear to us how much joint versus parallel
planning has taken place. We have not heard of a major operational role for
the Indian Navy or parallel sea-launched attacks. (Reftel provides further
analysis of the military aspects of Cold Start doctrine and implementation).
¶4. (S/NF) A positive attribute of Cold Start from the Indian perspective is
that the short 72-hour time period between decision and attack could shield
the GOI from international pressure to refrain from taking military action
against Pakistan. India’s prolonged 2002 mobilization period gave the
international community notice of Indian troop movements and allowed plenty
of time for a series of Western interlocutors to lobby GOI leaders. Even if
the plan is never actually implemented — and there is considerable question
as to GOI intent to ever implement it — news of Cold Start’s existence
has already paid dividends to Indian policymakers by providing reassurance
to the Indian public that the GOI has the means to punish Pakistan for
attacks on Indian soil without triggering potential mutually-assured nuclear
destruction. From the Indian perspective, the unimplemented plan has the
added virtue of accentuating Pakistani discomfiture and angst, which in
theory may have some deterrent value.
Prospects for Cold Start
————————
¶5. (S/NF) As noted above, GOI intent to ever actually implement Cold Start
is very much an open question. The Cold Start doctrine was announced in
April 2004 by the BJP-led government that was replaced shortly thereafter by
the Manmohan Singh government, which has not since publicly embraced Cold
Start. A political green-light to implement Cold Start, fraught as it is
with potential nuclear consequences, would involve a highly opaque decision-
making process and would likely necessitate broad political consensus, a
factor that could prolong the time between a precipitating event such as
a Pakistan-linked terror attack and Cold Start deployment (which in turn
could reduce the element of surprise). We lack firm details of the decision-
making process that the political leadership would use in the event of an
incident that would trigger consideration of Cold Start or other military
action against Pakistan. The precise function of the Cabinet Committee on
Security in ratifying decisions to take military action, the character of the
military’s advisory responsibilities to the Cabinet, the possible ad hoc
nature of decision-making in the upper levels of the Indian government and
the role of Congress Party figures like Sonia Gandhi in this process are not
clearly understood.
¶6. (S/NF) If the GOI were to implement Cold Start given present Indian
military capabilities, it is the collective judgment of the Mission that
India would likely encounter very mixed results. Indian forces could
have significant problems consolidating initial gains due to logistical
difficulties and slow reinforcement. Reftel sets forth in detail the various
resource challenges that India would have to overcome, challenges that range
from road and rail transportation to ammunition supply. In addition, Cold
Start’s reliance on swift mobile advance would have to contend with a large
number of built-up populated areas in Pakistan that the Indian Army did not
have to face in 1971, the last time it advanced in force into Pakistani
Punjab and Sindh.
¶7. (S/NF) Indian leaders no doubt realize that, although Cold Start is
designed to punish Pakistan in a limited manner without triggering a nuclear
response, they can not be sure whether Pakistani leaders will in fact refrain
from such a response. Even in the absence of a Pakistani nuclear response,
GOI leaders are aware also that even a limited Indian incursion into Pakistan
will likely lead to international condemnation of Indian action and a
resulting loss of the moral high ground that GOI leaders believe India enjoys
in its contentious relationship with Pakistan.
Comment
——-
¶8. (S/NF) We think that the November 2008 Pakistan-linked terror attack in
Mumbai and its immediate aftermath provide insight into Indian and Pakistani
thinking on Cold Start. First, the GOI refrained from implementing Cold Start
even after an attack as audacious and bloody as the Mumbai attack, which
calls into serious question the GOI’s willingness to actually adopt the
Cold Start option. Second, the Pakistanis have known about Cold Start since
2004, but this knowledge does not seem to have prompted them to prevent
terror attacks against India to extent such attacks could be controlled.
This fact calls into question Cold Start’s ability to deter Pakistani
mischief inside India. Even more so, it calls into question the degree of
sincerity of fear over Cold Start as expressed by Pakistani military leaders
to USG officials. Cold Start is not India’s only or preferred option after
a terrorist attack. Depending on the nature, location, lethality, public
response, and timing of a terrorist attack, India might not respond at all
or could pursue one of several other possible options. Finally, several
very high level GOI officials have firmly stated, when asked directly about
their support for Cold Start, that they have never endorsed, supported,
or advocated for this doctrine. One of these officials is former National
Security Advisor M.K. Narayanan, who has recently been replaced. While the
army may remain committed to the goals of the doctrine, political support is
less clear. ROEMER
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