Ramanisblog

Tag: Zbigniew Brzezinski

  • “La CIA a inventé Taliban, d’Al-Qaïda” Pak intelligence d’Offiicial je

    Juste quand je réjouissais de ce que les éléments saner au Pakistan aient prédominé sur les purs et durs dans la forme de jeunes gens montant contre le terrorisme en demandant la compréhension des Pakistanais (un Blogger a commencé cela s’il vous plaît a lu mon blog) et la riposte par une fille de 13 ans contre l’attaque de Taliban au Pakistan, j’ai trouvé par hasard un article écrit par un Officier Retraité de Bureau d’Intelligence, le Gouvernement du Pakistan.

    Aamir Mughal Research l’Officier d’Intelligence d’Analyste / l’Ancien Officier d’Intelligence de DIB, le Pakistan..

    Dans un article qu’il cite abondamment à partir de sources provenant des ÉTATS-UNIS , y compris nous des espions et nous documents comme le New York Times, le Washington Post et retrace l’histoire des Taliban à l’époque de Reagan et soutient le mollah Omar a effectivement été un combattant contre les Taliban.

    Après avoir traversé ce l’un devient confus.

    Est-ce vrai?

    Y a-t-il une ont plus d’informations à ce sujet?

    Histoire :
    Couvercle de Jimmy Carter
    Steve Coll termine son livre important sur l’Afghanistan – Ghost Wars : l’Histoire secrète de la CIA, l’Afghanistan et bin Laden,
    Depuis l’invasion soviétique au 10 septembre 2001-en citant le président afghan, M. Hamid Karzaï : “Quelle malchance un pays.” Les Américains pourraient trouver là un moyen pratique de faire abstraction de ce que leur gouvernement n’en Afghanistan entre 1979 et le présent, mais chance n’a rien à voir avec elle.

    BRUTALE, incompétent, opérations secrètes de la Central Intelligence Agency des ÉTATS-UNIS, souvent manipulés par les services de renseignement militaire du Pakistan et de l’Arabie saoudite, qui a causé la dévastation catastrophique de ce pauvre pays.
    Sur les éléments de preuve contenus dans Coll’s book Ghost Wars, ni les Américains, ni leurs victimes dans de nombreux musulmans et les pays du tiers monde ne connaîtra jamais la paix jusqu’à ce que l’Agence centrale de renseignement a été aboli.

    Il devrait être maintenant généralement accepté que l’invasion soviétique de l’Afghanistan à la veille de Noël 1979, a été délibérément provoquée par les ÉTATS-UNIS . Dans ses mémoires publiés en 1996, l’ancien directeur de la CIA Robert Gates a dit clairement que l’intelligence américaine services a commencé à l’aide la guérilla moudjahidin pas après l’invasion soviétique, mais six mois avant.
    Dans une interview deux ans plus tard avec Le Nouvel Observateur, le président Carter le conseiller à la sécurité nationale Zbigniew Brzezinski fièrement Gates a confirmé l’affirmation. ” Selon la version officielle de l’histoire,” a dit M. Brzezinski, “CIA aide aux moudjahidin a commencé au cours de l’année 1980, c’est-à-dire, après que l’armée soviétique a envahi l’Afghanistan.
    Mais la réalité, gardé secret jusqu’à maintenant, est complètement différente : le 3 juillet 1979 le président Carter a signé la première directive secrète pour aide aux opposants de la pro-régime soviétique à Kaboul. Et le même jour, j’ai écrit une note au président dans laquelle j’ai expliqué qu’à mon avis, cette aide pourrait conduire à une intervention militaire soviétique.”

    On lui a demandé s’il en aucune façon a déploré ces actions, Brzezinski a répondu : regrette quoi? L’opération secrète a été une excellente idée. Il a appelé les Russes dans le piège Afghan et vous voulez que je le regrette ?
    Le jour où les Soviétiques ont officiellement franchi la frontière, j’ai écrit au président Carter, en disant, en substance: “Nous avons maintenant l’occasion de donner à l’URSS sa guerre du Vietnam.”

    Le Nouvel Observateur : “Et vous n’en avez regrette d’avoir appuyé le fondamentalisme islamique, qui a donné des armes et des conseils aux futurs terroristes? “.

     

    Les motifs de la Maison Blanche et la CIA ont été façonnées par la guerre froide : la volonté de tuer autant de soldats soviétiques que possible et le désir de restaurer une certaine aura de machisme robuste ainsi que sa crédibilité que dirigeants américains craignaient qu’ils avaient perdu quand le Shah d’Iran a été renversé. La CIA n’avait aucune stratégie complexe de la guerre qu’il a déclenchée en Afghanistan.

     

    Howard Hart, l’agence représentant dans la capitale pakistanaise, Coll a dit qu’il comprenait ses ordres comme: “Vous êtes un jeune homme; voici votre sac d’argent, allez soulever l’enfer. Ne pas fuck-up, juste y aller et tuer soviétiques.” Ces ordres venaient des des plus étranges américain.
    William Casey, la CIA director à partir de janvier 1981 à janvier 1987, était un catholique Chevalier de Malte éduqué par les Jésuites.

    Quand les voisins sont venus le mollah Mohammed Omar, dans le printemps de l’année 1994, ils avaient une histoire qui était même choquant par la sombre normes d’Afghanistan’ s 18-année de guerre civile. Deux adolescentes du mollah du village de Singesar avaient été enlevés par l’un des gangs de moudjahidin, ou “guerriers sacrés,” qui contrôlait la plupart des campagnes afghanes.

    Les filles chefs avait été rasée, ils avaient été pris à un point de contrôle à l’extérieur du village et ils avaient été violées à plusieurs reprises.

    À l’époque, le mollah Omar a été un obscur figure, un ancien commandant de la guérilla contre occupation forces soviétiques qui étaient rentrés en dégoût à la terreur groupes moudjahidin ont infligées sur l’Afghanistan .

    Il était vivant en tant qu’étudiant ou talib, dans une boue de parois école religieuse que centrée sur l’apprentissage par coeur du Coran.
    Mais les filles sort déplacé lui d’agir. Rassemblement 30 anciens guérilleros, qui passa entre eux 16 fusils Kalachnikov, il a dirigé une attaque sur le checkpoint, libéré les filles et liée commandant du poste de contrôle par un noeud coulant sur le fourreau d’un vieux char soviétique.

    Comme ceux qui l’entourent et lui a crié “Dieu est grand!” Le mollah Omar a ordonné le réservoir baril soulevées et à gauche l’homme mort qui pend comme un sinistre avertissement.

    L’épisode Singesar est maintenant partie du folklore Afghan. À peine 30 mois après sa prise de carabine, le mollah Omar est le souverain suprême de la plus grande partie de l’Afghanistan.

    Le mollah, un heavyset âgé de 38 ans qui a perdu son oeil droit dans la guerre contre les Russes, est connue pour ses disciples comme Prince de tous les croyants. Il dirige un état islamique mouvement religieux, les Taliban, qui a conquis 20 d’Afghanistan’ s 32 provinces……………………………………………………………………….Suite..

    http://chagataikhan.blogspot.in/2010/03/ronald-reagn-afghan-mujahideen-talibans.html

     

    http://hnn.us/articles/8438.html

    *L’article est qu’on sifflotait en anglais. Veuillez informer si il y a inauuracies. Enhanced by Zemanta

  • “CIA Invented Taliban,Al Qaeda”Pak Intellignece Offiicial I

    Just when I was rejoicing that the saner elements in Pakistan has prevailed over the hardliners  in the form of youngsters rising against terrorism by calling for understanding of the Pakistanis(a Blogger started this-please read my blog) and the retort by a 13-year-old girl against Taliban attack in Pakistan , I came across a an article written by a Retired Officer of Intelligence Bureau, Government of Pakistan.,Research Analyst/Former Intelligence Officer of DIB, Pakistan..

    In an article he quotes extensively from sources from the US, including US Spies and US papers like New York Times, Washington Post and traces the History of the Taliban to the Times of Reagan and argues Mullah Omar was actually a Fighter against the Taliban.

    After going through this one gets confused.

    Is this true?

    Does any one have more information on this subject?

    Story:

    Jimmy Carter
    Cover of Jimmy Carter

    Steve Coll ends his important book on Afghanistan — Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to 10 September 2001–by quoting Afghan President Hamid Karzai: “What an unlucky country.” Americans might find this a convenient way to ignore what their government did in Afghanistan between 1979 and the present, but luck had nothing to do with it. Brutal, incompetent, secret operations of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, frequently manipulated by the military intelligence agencies of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, caused the catastrophic devastation of this poor country. On the evidence contained in Coll’s book Ghost Wars, neither the Americans nor their victims in numerous Muslim and Third World countries will ever know peace until the Central Intelligence Agency has been abolished. It should by now be generally accepted that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on Christmas Eve 1979 was deliberately provoked by the United States. In his memoir published in 1996, the former CIA director Robert Gates made it clear that the American intelligence services began to aid the mujahidin guerrillas not after the Soviet invasion, but six months before it. In an interview two years later with Le Nouvel Observateur, President Carter‘s national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski proudly confirmed Gates’s assertion. “According to the official version of history,” Brzezinski said, “CIA aid to the mujahidin began during 1980, that’s to say, after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. But the reality, kept secret until now, is completely different: on 3 July 1979 President Carter signed the first directive for secret aid to the opponents of the pro-Soviet regime in Kabul. And on the same day, I wrote a note to the president in which I explained that in my opinion this aid would lead to a Soviet military intervention.”….

    Asked whether he in any way regretted these actions,

    Brzezinski replied: Regret what? The secret operation was an excellent idea. It drew the Russians into the Afghan trap and you want me to regret it? On the day that the Soviets officially crossed the border, I wrote to President Carter, saying, in essence: ‘We now have the opportunity of giving to the USSR its Vietnam War.’

    Nouvel Observateur: “And neither do you regret having supported Islamic fundamentalism, which has given arms and advice to future terrorists?”

    Brzezinski: “What is more important in world history? The Taliban or the collapse of the Soviet empire? Some agitated Muslims or the liberation of Central Europe and the end of the Cold War?

    The motives of the White House and the CIA were shaped by the Cold War: a determination to kill as many Soviet soldiers as possible and the desire to restore some aura of rugged machismo as well as credibility that U.S. leaders feared they had lost when the Shah of Iran was overthrown. The CIA had no intricate strategy for the war it was unleashing in Afghanistan. Howard Hart, the agency’s representative in the Pakistani capital, told Coll that he understood his orders as: “You’re a young man; here’s your bag of money, go raise hell. Don’t fuck it up, just go out there and kill Soviets.” These orders came from a most peculiar American. William Casey, the CIA’s director from January 1981 to January 1987, was a Catholic Knight of Malta educated by Jesuits.

    When neighbors came to Mullah Mohammed Omar in the spring of 1994, they had a story that was shocking even by the grim standards of Afghanistan’ s 18-year-old civil war. Two teen-age girls from the mullah’s village of Singesar had been abducted by one of the gangs of mujahedeen, or ”holy warriors,” who controlled much of the Afghan countryside. The girls’ heads had been shaved, they had been taken to a checkpoint outside the village and they had been repeatedly raped. At the time, Mullah Omar was an obscure figure, a former guerrilla commander against occupying Soviet forces who had returned home in disgust at the terror mujahedeen groups were inflicting on Afghanistan. He was living as a student, or talib, in a mud-walled religious school that centered on rote learning of the Koran. But the girls’ plight moved him to act. Gathering 30 former guerrilla fighters, who mustered between them 16 Kalashnikov rifles, he led an attack on the checkpoint, freed the girls and tied the checkpoint commander by a noose to the barrel of an old Soviet tank. As those around him shouted ”God is Great!” Mullah Omar ordered the tank barrel raised and left the dead man hanging as a grisly warning. The Singesar episode is now part of Afghan folklore. Barely 30 months after taking up his rifle, Mullah Omar is the supreme ruler of most of Afghanistan. The mullah, a heavyset 38-year old who lost his right eye in the war against the Russians, is known to his followers as Prince of All Believers. He leads an Islamic religious movement, the Taliban, that has conquered 20 of Afghanistan’ s 32 provinces..

    http://chagataikhan.blogspot.in/2010/03/ronald-reagn-afghan-mujahideen-talibans.html

    http://hnn.us/articles/8438.html

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  • This is How US would Wage A Nuclear War-Declassified Documents.

    Declassified Documents released by the US on Foreign Policy during Jimmy Carter,Brezhnev era reveal how the US will wage the Nuclear War and its counter measures to Nuclear Strike.( National Security Archive,The George Washington University)

    Read On’

    Signed by President Jimmy Carter on July 25, 1980, the directive (titled “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy”) aimed to give presidents more flexibility in planning for and executing a nuclear war — that is, options beyond a massive strike. Leaks of the document’s Top Secret contents, within weeks of its approval, gave rise to front-page stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post, alleging that its changes to U.S. strategy lowered the threshold of a decision to go nuclear.

    With other recently declassified material, PD-59 shows that the United States was indeed preparing to fight a nuclear war, with the hope of enduring. To do this, it sought a nuclear force posture that ensured a “high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions.” If deterrence failed, the United States “must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable.”

    Perhaps even more remarkable than this guidance is the fact that, although the Obama administration is conducting a review of U.S. nuclear targeting guidance, key concepts behind PD-59 still drive U.S. policy to this day.

    The National Security Archive obtained the virtually unexpurgated document in response to a mandatory declassification review request to the Jimmy Carter Library. Highly classified for years, PD-59 was signed during a period of heightened Cold War tensions owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, greater instability in the Middle East, and earlier strains over China policy, human rights, the Horn of Africa, and Euromissiles. Press coverage at the time elicited debate inside and outside the government, with some arguing that the directive would aggravate Cold War tensions by increasing Soviet fears about vulnerability and raising pressures for launch-on-warning in a crisis.

    A key element of PD-59 was to use high-tech intelligence to find nuclear weapons targets in battlefield situations, strike the targets, and then assess the damage — a “look-shoot-look” capability. A memorandum from NSC military aide William Odom depicted Secretary of Defense Harold Brown doing exactly that in a recent military exercise where he was “chasing [enemy] general purpose forces in East Europe and Korea with strategic weapons.” That is, he was planning how to use large nuclear weapons to defeat conventional troops. Drafters of PD-59 like Odom did not believe that deploying weapons in this way would necessarily result in apocalypse — they believed they could control escalation during a nuclear war.

    National Security Archive Electronic Briefing Book No. 390

    Posted – September 14, 2012

    For more information contact:
    William Burr –     202/994-7000 or nsarchiv@gwu.edu

    National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski sitting to the right of Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. While Brzezinski kept Vance in the loop on the nuclear targeting review, eventually the State Department was cut out. (Photo from National Archives Still Pictures Branch, RG 59-SO, box 18)
    Zbigniew Brzezinski’s military assistant Colonel William E. Odom played a central role in drafting PD-59 (Photo from William E. Odom Papers, box 30, Library of Congress Manuscript Division).
    President Jimmy Carter greeting Secretary of State Edmund Muskie at a reception at the close of the administration. (Photo from National Archives Still Pictures Branch, RG 59-SE, box 8, file VS-121-81)
    An exmple of the extensive press coverage of PD-59 during August 1980, The Washington Post, August 6, 1980.

    Washington, D.C., September 14, 2012 – The National Security Archive is today posting – for the first time in its essentially complete form – one of the most controversial nuclear policy directives of the Cold War. Presidential Directive 59 (PD-59), “Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy,” signed by President Jimmy Carter on 25 July 1980, aimed at giving U.S. Presidents more flexibility in planning for and executing a nuclear war, but leaks of its Top Secret contents, within weeks of its approval, gave rise to front-page stories in the New York Times and the Washington Post that stoked wide-spread fears about its implications for unchecked nuclear conflict.

    The National Security Archive obtained the virtually unexpurgated document in response to a mandatory declassification review request to the Jimmy Carter Library [See Document 12]. Highly classified for years, PD 59 was signed during a period of heightened Cold War tensions owing to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, greater instability in the Middle East, and earlier strains over China policy, human rights, the Horn of Africa, and Euromissiles.

    In this context, the press coverage quickly generated controversy by raising apprehensions that alleged changes in U.S. strategy might lower the threshold of a decision by either side to go nuclear, which could inject dangerous uncertainty into the already fragile strategic balance. The press coverage elicited debate inside and outside the government, with some arguing that the PD would aggravate Cold War tensions by increasing Soviet fears about vulnerability and raising pressures for launch-on-warning in a crisis. Adding to the confusion was the fact that astonishingly, even senior government officials who had concerns about the directive did not have access to it.

    With other recently declassified material related to PD-59, today’s publication helps settle the mystery of what Jimmy Carter actually signed, [1] as well as shedding light on the origins of PD-59 and some of its consequences. Among the disclosures are a variety of fascinating insights about the thinking of key U.S. officials about the state of nuclear planning and the possible progression of events should war break out:

    • PD-59 sought a nuclear force posture that ensured a “high high degree of flexibility, enduring survivability, and adequate performance in the face of enemy actions.” If deterrence failed, the United States “must be capable of fighting successfully so that the adversary would not achieve his war aims and would suffer costs that are unacceptable.” To make that feasible, PD-59 called for pre-planned nuclear strike options and capabilities for rapid development of target plans against such key target categories as “military and control targets,” including nuclear forces, command-and-control, stationary and mobile military forces, and industrial facilities that supported the military. Moreover, the directive stipulated strengthened command-control-communications and intelligence (C3I) systems.
    • President Carter’s first instructions on the U.S. nuclear force posture, in PD-18, “U.S. National Strategy,” supported “essential equivalence”, which rejected a “strategic force posture inferior to the Soviet Union” or a “disarming first strike” capability, and also sought a capability to execute “limited strategic employment options.”
    • A key element of PD-59 was to use high-tech intelligence to find nuclear weapons targets in battlefield situations, strike the targets, and then assess the damage-a “look-shoot-look” capability. A memorandum from NSC military aide William Odom depicted Secretary of Defense Harold Brown doing exactly that in a recent military exercise where he was “chasing [enemy] general purpose forces in East Europe and Korea with strategic weapons.”
    • The architects of PD-59 envisioned the possibility of protracted nuclear war that avoided escalation to all-out conflict. According to Odom’s memorandum, “rapid escalation” was not likely because national leaders would realize how “vulnerable we are and how scarce our nuclear weapons are.” They would not want to “waste” them on non-military targets and “days and weeks will pass as we try to locate worthy targets.”
    • An element of PD-59 that never leaked to the press was a pre-planned option for launch-on-warning. It was included in spite of objections from NSC staffers, who saw it as “operationally a very dangerous thing.”
    • Secretary of State Edmund Muskie was uninformed about PD-59 until he read it about in the newspapers, according to a White House chronology. The State Department had been involved in early discussions of nuclear targeting policy, but National Security Adviser Brzezinski eventually cut out the Department on the grounds that targeting is “so closely related to military contingency planning, an activity that justly remains a close-hold prerogative and responsibility” of the Pentagon.
    • The drafters of PD 59 accepted controversial ideas that the Soviets had a concept of victory in nuclear war and already had limited nuclear options. Marshall Shulman, the Secretary of State’s top adviser on Soviet affairs, had not seen PD-59 but questioned these ideas in a memorandum to Secretary Muskie: “We may be placing more weight on the Soviet [military] literature than is warranted.” If the Soviets perused U.S. military writing, it could “easily convince them that we have such options and such beliefs.” Post-Cold War studies suggest that Shulman was correct because the Soviet leadership realized that neither side could win a nuclear war and had little confidence in the Soviet Union’s ability to survive a nuclear conflict.
    • http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nukevault/ebb390/