The inner workings of al Qaeda was obtained by CNN and it is quoted here.
Strangely or not so strangely it was found in a Porn File.
Osama Bin Laden was religiously watching Porn Daily
”
A year since the death of Osama bin Laden, CNN has gained access to documents that outline al Qaeda‘s inner workings, including details of high-profile plots and attacks.
Journalists from the network – including CNN’s senior international correspondent Nic Robertson – have viewed one of a total of 141 documents found following the arrest of two al Qaeda operates. The arrests, which were made by German intelligence operatives, took place in Europe in the days following the death of Osama bin Laden last year.
The documents were discovered hidden within a pornographic movie on a data chip with highly sophisticated security encryption. They offer an intimate insight into some of al Qaeda’s most notorious operations, as well as some of the tactics used by the organization as it attempts to elude the counter-terrorism initiatives of the world’s military and intelligence agencies.
The documents contain the first ever confirmation that al Qaeda was behind the London 7/7 and 7/21 plots, as well as the plan to use liquid explosives in a campaign of terror on airlines. They contain a highly detailed 46 page account from Rashid Rauf, the terrorist behind the plots.
“These documents show that London was extremely lucky on 7/21. The terrorists were using the same bomb-building instructions as the 7/7 bombers, who had actually encountered the same problem with the way they had mixed their explosives,” said Robertson. ” The 7/7 bombers had closer contacts with Rauf and were able to contact him and change their bombs so that they worked.”
Robertson adds: “These documents lay open al Qaeda’s inner workings. They prove the links between some of its highest profile plots and attacks, and show how it is trying to cope with the constant pressure from military and intelligence operations against it.”
Aerial view of Osama bin Laden’s compound in the pakistani city of Abbottabad made by the CIA. Italiano: Vista aerea del complesso di Osama bin Laden nella città pakistana di Abbottabad realizzata dalla CIA. (Photo credit: Wikipedia)
The heavily-fortified complex, where bin Laden is believed to have lived with his children and three wives, was destroyed by Pakistani security forces in February, following his death at the hands of U.S. special forces in a raid on May 2, 2011.
While most of the physical reminders of bin Laden’s presence in the town have been destroyed, visitors have ensured the memory of the world’s most-wanted fugitive lives on a year after his death, despite resentment from locals seeking to move on.
Ghulam Nabi, a young bearded man, crouches over a broken pipe that lies at the foot of the demolished site, drinking water from the palms of his hands.
Nabi, taking a break from his work in the nearby fields, says he only lives a few minutes from bin Laden’s former hideout — once a two-story compound surrounded by high concrete walls, security gates, razor wire, and cameras.
The 20-year-old, who has lived in Abbottabad for the past eight months, says superstition lures dozens of daily visitors, whom he says consider the water at the compound “sacred.”
“Many people visit the compound daily, even from places like Lahore and Karachi,” he says. “I have never met them but I see them from my rooftop. Many of those people believe the water is holy.”
Nabi himself is skeptical of such claims.
“It’s just water from a broken water pipe,” he says. “For the people who visit the compound there is nothing for them to see so they drink the water and eat the herbs growing in the garden.”
The ‘Osama Cricket Stadium’
Not far from where Nabi is seated, three young boys are absorbed in a game of cricket — the country’s national sport.
The shabbily-dressed youngsters have made a field on the compound, where one of them swings a plank of wood, while the other two throw him pebbles, their substitutes for a bat and ball.
One of the boys, who declined to give his name, says the demolished site should be transformed into a playground.
“This place should be called the Osama Cricket Stadium,” he jokes. “This compound is the only place where we can play cricket. There are so many fields and houses in the area, so they should make a playground here.”
While these boys use the site for recreation, others trudge up to the compound every day in a bid to make some money, gathering scrap metal and concrete which they haul back to local bazaars.
For some of the children, the cash they receive in exchange for the materials is an essential contribution to their family’s livelihood.
When bin Laden’s compound was bulldozed by Pakistani authorities on February 25, many locals expressed relief that life would go back to normal.
Many were left increasingly frustrated by the tightened security that followed the raid on the compound, with locals having to go through numerous security checkpoints just to move through the town.
For Pakistan’s military establishment, the empty complex was a painful reminder of the unilateral operation that killed the former Al-Qaeda leader just a short distance away from one of Pakistan’s most prestigious military academies.
‘Just Hype And Drama’
Many locals remain tight-lipped when talking about bin Laden even today. But of those who do talk, many question whether he even lived in Abbottabad.
In one of the town center’s barber shops, men busily discuss conspiracy theories surrounding bin Laden’s death.
An elderly man, sipping tea in a couch, says bin Laden was a hero. But the man, speaking anonymously, suggests that he was killed a long time ago and was never in Abbottabad.
“Osama was killed three or four years ago,” he says. “The recent attack against the compound was just hype and drama. We [residents of Abbottabad] don’t believe he ever lived here.”
The old man adds that if bin Laden was indeed killed by U.S. forces, then evidence would have been brought forward.
He questions why bin Laden’s body was dumped out at sea and never photographed, adding that only hard evidence will change his mind and those of countless others.
While he was expecting some call to mobilize his men and equipment he heard the news which transferred his life completely. The Americans are coming. He always describes that moment as shocking moment. He felt depressed and thought that maneuvers had to change. Instead of writing to the king or approaching other members of the royal family, he started lobbying through religious scholars and Muslim activists. He succeeded in extracting a fatwah from one of the senior scholars that training and readiness is a religious duty. He immediately circulated that fatwah and convinced people to have their training in Afghanistan. It was estimated that 4000 went to Afghanistan in response to the fatwah. The regime was not happy with his activities so they limited his movement to Jeddah only. He was summoned for questioning twice for some of his speeches and activities and was given warnings. To intimidate him, the regime raided his farm in the suburb of Jeddah by the National Guard. He was not there during the raid and was very angry when told. He wrote a letter of protest to Prince Abdullah. Abdullah apologized and claimed he is not aware and promised to punish who ever were responsible.
Osama was fed up with this almost house arrest situation and did not imagine himself able to stay in the country with the American forces around. One of his brothers was very close to King Fahad and also close to Prince Ahmed, deputy minister of interior. He convinced his brother that he needed to leave the country to sort out some business matters in Pakistan and come back. There was a difficult obstacle, the stubborn Prince Nayef, minister of interior. His brother waited until Nayef went in a trip outside the kingdom and extracted lifting the ban from prince Ahmed. When he arrived in Pakistan around April 1991 he sent a letter to his brother telling him that he is not coming back and apologized for letting him down with the royal family.
After his arrival to Pakistan he went straight to Afghanistan because he knew the Pakistani intelligence would hand him back to the Saudis. There, he attended the collapse of the communist regime and the consequent dispute between the Afghan parties. He spent great effort to arbitrate between them but with no success He ordered his followers to avoid any involvement in the conflict and told them it was a sin to side with any faction. During his stay the Saudis tried more than once to kidnap or kill him in collaboration with the Pakistani intelligence. His friends in the Saudi and Pakistani establishments would always leak the plan and make him ready for it. After his failure in sorting the Afghani dispute, he decided to leave Afghanistan. The only alternative country he had was Sudan. He left Afghanistan disguised in private jet only few months after his arrival. That was late 1991.
His choice of Sudan had nothing to do with jihad or “terrorism.” He was attracted to Sudan because of what was at that time an Islamic banner raised by the new regime in Sudan. He wanted to have good refuge as well as help the government in its construction projects. There was no intention from his side or from the Sudanese regime to have any military activity in Sudan. Indeed the Sudanese government refused even sending some of his followers to the front in the south. He was treated in Sudan as a special guest who wanted to help Sudan when everybody was turning away. In Sudan he mobilized a lot of construction equipment and enrolled himself in busy construction projects. He spent good effort in convincing Saudi businessmen to invest in Sudan and had reasonable success. Many of his brothers and Jeddah merchants had and still have investment in real estate, farming and agricultural industry. In Sudan he had again escaped an assassination attempt which turned out later to be the plan of Saudi intelligence.
During his stay in Sudan anti-American incidents happened in Somalia and South Yemen. Neither of the two incidents was performed by his group in the proper sense of chain of command. Both were performed by people who had training in Afghanistan and had enough anti-American drive. He might have given some sanctioning to the operations but one thing was certain, the Sudanese were completely unaware of either.
Between his arrival to Sudan and early 1994 he was not regarded publicly as Saudi opposition and Saudi citizens were visiting him without too much precautions. Only the well-informed people would know that he was classified as enemy to the Saudi regime. His assets were frozen sometime between 1992 and 1994 but that was not published. The Saudis decided to announce their hostility early 1994 when they publicized withdrawing his citizenship.
After long silence and tolerance, bin Laden replied by issuing a communiqué condemning the Saudi decision and saying that he does not need the “Saudi” reference to identify himself and it is not up to Al-Saud to admit or expel people from Arabian Peninsula. He then formed together with activists and scholars from the kingdom a group called “Advice and Reform Committee” (ARC). The ARC was, according to its communiqués and published agenda, a purely political group. The ARC published around 17 communiqués which might have contained harsh criticism of the Saudi regime and plenty of religious rhetoric but never contained reference for violence or incitment of violence.
The car bomb in spring 1995 in Riyadh was the first major anti-American action in the kingdom. Bin Laden never claimed responsibility, but the Saudi government tried to link the incident to bin Laden by showing video confessions of four “Arab Afghans” involved in the bombing.
Sudan was exposed to huge international pressure for hosting bin Laden and his followers, and bin Laden felt that he is becoming an embarrassment to the Sudanese. Early in 1996 he started making contacts with his old friends in Afghanistan to prepare for his reception. He fled Sudan in a very well planned trip with many of his followers to go straight to Jalalabad in Eastern Afghanistan.
When he arrived there, the situation in Afghanistan was very unsettled between the many factions, but he had very good relations with all factions and all would protect him. The area he arrived to was under control of Yunis Khalis, a very influential warlord who later on joined Taliban.
June 1996, after his arrival in Afghanistan was the Khobar bombing. Nobody claimed responsibility, but sources from inside the Saudi ministry of interior confirmed involvement of Arab Afghans, with possible link to bin Laden The Saudi government wanted to frame Shi’a, at the beginning but Americans were very suspicious of the Saudi story. Bin Laden himself never claimed responsibility but gave many hints that he might have been involved. The Saudi government has acknowledged recently that bin Laden’s men were behind the bombing.
In 1984 he had one further step in strengthening his presence in Afghanistan by establishing the guesthouse in Peshawar (Baitul’ansar). That house was supposed to be the first station of Arab mujahedeen when they come to Afghanistan before going to the front or start training. At that period Osama did not have his own command or training camps. He used to send the newcomers to one of the Afghan factions.
The guesthouse establishment was coinciding with the formation of Jihad Service Bureau by Abdullah Azzam in Peshawar. The Bureau was very active in terms of media, publications and charity work. The Bureau publications were important in attracting more Saudis and Arabs to Afghanistan.
In 1986 Osama decided to have his own camps inside Afghanistan and within two years he built more than six camps. Some were mobilized more than once. He decided to have his own front and to run his own battles with his own command. Among the Arab fighters he had, there were senior Arab ex-military men from Syria and Egypt with good military experience. The story of the guesthouse and the camps was very attractive for more Arab mujahedeen to come and there was a significant surge in their numbers at that period.
In addition to many exchanges of fire and small operations, the first major battle he had face to face with the Soviet army with pure Arab personnel was the battle of Jaji in the province of Baktia 200 kilometers away from Khost. From then until 1989 he had more than five major battles with hundreds of small operations and exchanges of fire. During the period 1984-1989 he was staying more in Afghanistan than Saudi Arabia. He would spend a total of eight months a year or more in Afghanistan.
In 1988 he noticed that he was backward in his documentation and was not able to give answers to some families asking about their loved ones gone missing in Afghanistan. He decided to make the matter much more organized and arranged for proper documentation. He made a tracking record of the visitors, be they mujahedeen or charity or simple visitors. Their movement between the guesthouse and the camps had to be recorded as well as their first arrival and final departure. The whole complex was then termed Al-Qa’edah which is an Arabic word meaning “The Base.” Al-Qa’edah was very much public knowledge. It was funny to see some people triumphing because they discovered it!
Late 1989 after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he went to the kingdom in an ordinary trip. There he was banned from travel and was trapped in the kingdom. The Soviet withdrawal might have been a factor but the main reason for the travel ban were his intentions to start a new “front” of jihad in South Yemen. In addition, he embarrassed the regime by lectures and speeches warning of impending invasion by Saddam. At that time the regime was at very good terms with Saddam. He was instructed officially to keep low profile and not to give public talks. Despite the travel ban he was not hostile to regime at this stage. Indeed he presented a written advice in the form of a detailed, personal, private and confidential letter to the king few weeks before the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
He reacted swiftly to Iraqi invasion and saw it fulfilling his prophecy. He immediately forwarded another letter to the king suggesting in detail how to protect the country from potentially advancing Iraqi forces. In addition to many military tactics suggested, he volunteered to bring all the Arab mujahedeen to defend the kingdom. That letter was presented in the first few days of the incident, and the regime response was of consideration! http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html#ixzz1tJPwKIH7
Born 1957 for Syrian mother, Osama bin Laden was the seventh son among fifty brothers and sisters.
His father Mohammed Awad bin Laden came to the kingdom from Hadramout (South Yemen) sometime around 1930. The father started his life as a very poor laborer (porter in Jeddah port), to end up as owner of the biggest construction company in the kingdom. During the reign of King Saud, bin Laden the father became very close to the royal family when he took the risk of building King Saud’s palaces much cheaper than the cheapest bid. He impressed King Saud with his performance but he also built good relations with other members of the royal family, especially Faisal. During the Saud-Faisal conflict in the early sixties, bin Laden the father had a big role in convincing King Saud to step down in favor of Faisal. After Saud’s departure the treasury was empty and bin Laden was so supportive to King Faisal that he literally paid the civil servants’ wages of the whole kingdom for six months. King Faisal then issued a decree that all construction projects should go to bin Laden. Indeed, he was appointed for a period as the minister of public works.
In 1969 the father took the task of rebuilding Al-Aqsa mosque after the fire incident. Interestingly the bin Laden family say that they have the credit of building all the three mosques, because later on their company took over the task of major extension in Mecca and Medina mosques.
The father was fairly devoted Moslem, very humble and generous. He was so proud of the bag he used when he was a porter that he kept it as a trophy in the main reception room in his palace. The father used to insist on his sons to go and manage some projects themselves.
The father had very dominating personality. He insisted to keep all his children in one premises. He had a tough discipline and observed all the children with strict religious and social code. He maintained a special daily program and obliged his children to follow. At the same time the father was entertaining with trips to the sea and desert. He dealt with his children as big men and demanded them to show confidence at young age. He was very keen not to show any difference in the treatment of his children.
Osama was exposed very early on his age to this experience but he lost his father when he was 13. He married at the age of 17 to a Syrian girl who was a relative. He grew up as religiously committed boy and the early marriage was another factor of protecting him from corruption.
Osama had his primary, secondary and even university education in Jeddah. He had a degree in public administration 1981 from King Abdul-Aziz university in Jeddah. Countries of the Arabian Peninsula, Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Sudan are the only countries he has been to. All stories of trips to Switzerland, Philippines, and London are all unfounded.
In addition to the general Islamic commitment he started forming an Islamic responsibility at early age. His father used to host hundreds of pilgrims during Hajj season from al over the world. Some of those were senior Islamic scholars or leaders of Muslim movements. This habit went on even after his father’s death through his elder brothers. He used to make good contacts and relations through those gatherings.
At secondary school and university he adopted the main trend of many educated Muslims at that time, Muslim Brotherhood. There was a collection of Muslim scholars in Jeddah and Mecca at that period. There was nothing extraordinary in his personality and that trend was rather very non-confrontational. Interestingly, the 1980 raid in the Grand Mosque in Mecca was not appealing to him, neither the theology or that group. He had two distinguished teachers in Islamic studies, which was a compulsory subject in the university. First was Abdullah Azzam who became later as one of the big names in Afghanistan and the second was Mohammed Quttub, a famous Islamic writer and philosopher.
The first encounter with Afghanistan was as early as the first two weeks of Soviet invasion. He went to Pakistan and was taken by his hosts Jamaat Islami from Karachi to Peshawar to see the refugees and meet some leaders. Some of those leaders like Rabbani and Sayyaf were common faces to him because he met them during Hajj gatherings That trip which was [a] secret trip lasted for almost a month and was an exploratory rather than action trip. He went back to the kingdom and started lobbying with his brothers, relatives and friends at the school to support the mujahedeen. He succeeded in collecting huge amount of money and material as donations to jihad. He made another trip to take this material. He took with him few Pakistanis and Afghanis who were working in bin Laden company for more than ten years. Again, he did not stay more than a month The trip was to Pakistan and the border only and was not to Afghanistan. He went on collecting money and going in short trips once or twice a year until 1982.
In 1982 he decided to go inside Afghanistan. He brought with him plenty of the construction machinery and put them at the disposal of the mujahedeen He started spending more and more time in Afghanistan occasionally joining actual battles but not in an organized manner. His presence was encouraging to more Saudis to come but the numbers were still small at that period. http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/who/bio.html#ixzz1tJJnpcMR
Within weeks of the September 11, 2001, attacks, Osama bin Laden was planning follow-up operations to bring down airliners in the United States and south-east Asia, according to a convicted al Qaeda operative testifying in a terror trial in New York.
Saajid Badat was speaking via a video deposition from the United Kingdom, where he is serving a jail sentence for his role in plotting to blow up a U.S. bound aircraft in December 2001.
It’s the first time that an al Qaeda operative has provided such detail about plans to bring down airliners in the wake of 9/11.
Badat testified that a few weeks after the 9/11 attacks, he met with Abu Hafs al Masri, then bin Laden’s right hand man, in the Jalalabad-Kabul area in Afghanistan.
“Abu Hafs asked me to take an explosive device onboard an airplane, a domestic airline [in the United States] and then detonate it,” Badat testified. He was then called to meet bin Laden himself.
“It was just the two of us in the room and he explained to me his justification for the mission,” said Badat.
“He said that the American economy is like a chain. If you break one link of the chain, the whole economy will be brought down. So after September 11th attacks, this operation will ruin the aviation industry and in turn the whole economy will come down,” he added.
Badat was then told to pick up two explosive shoes from an al Qaeda bomb-maker named Fathi. The explosives, he said, were concealed in the soles.
The idea was for him and Richard Reid, a British operative who came to be known as the “Shoe Bomber,” to blow up different planes simultaneously.
Reid tried to blow up an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001.
Before leaving Afghanistan in late November, Badat said he and Reid met with 9/11 mastermind Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.
“It was as if he was giving me final orders,” Badat testified.
“He just gave us advice on how to interact with each other, how to contact each other,” he said, adding that the communication between him and Reid was to be via e-mail.
When Badat arrived in the United Kingdom in December he said he got cold feet, fearing going through with the operation and the possible implications for his family. He described how he dismantled the shoe bomb he had brought with him and stored it in his parents’ house.
On December 14, 2001, he e-mailed his Pakistani handler to tell him he was backing out.
Badat now feels he and others were manipulated by al Qaeda’s top leadership.
During his video deposition he stated he was ready to testify against Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other top leaders to expose the hollowness of what he called their “bulls**t cause.”
Badat, who joined al Qaeda in Afghanistan in 2000, was testifying at the trial in New York of Adis Medunjanin, an American of Bosnian descent charged with involvement in a plot to explode bombs on the subway in September 2009. Though the two never met, Badat met at least one al Qaeda member Medunjanin is alleged to have encountered.
Badat also revealed that he and Reid left Afghanistan for Pakistan with a group of Malaysians militants.
“I learned that they had a group ready to perform a similar hijacking to 9/11,” Badat testified.
According to a 9/11 Commission report, al Qaeda initially planned to hijack a dozen airliners in South East Asia at the same time as in the United States, but bin Laden scrapped the south-east Asian portion of the plan.
The new revelations suggest that al Qaeda’s south-east Asian plan was revived after 9/11.
A senior U.S. counter-terrorism official told CNN al Qaeda planned to hijack aircraft in south-east Asia using militants who had begun training in flight schools in the region, but the plan was never carried through.
The official said Khalid Sheikh Mohammed orchestrated the post 9/11 south-east Asia hijacking plot and was assisted by Walid bin Attash, a Yemeni al Qaeda terrorist also now being held in Guantanamo Bay.
Two Jemaah Islamiya operatives resonsible for the 2002 Bali bombings – Hambali (real name: Riduan Isamuddin) and Ali Ghufron (real name: Huda bin Abdul Haq) – are also suspected of having had a role in the plot, according to the official.
Badat recalled how a few months before the 9/11 attacks, he was instructed to “collect intelligence on various Jewish locations in South Africa to be viewed as potential targets.”
Badat said he researched potential targets on the Internet and put together a report. But despite being tasked to travel to South Africa, he never took the trip.
Days before 9/11, Badat was dispatched to Belgium to meet with Nizar Trabelsi, a Tunisian then planning a terrorist operation who also met bin Laden in Afghanistan.
Trabelsi was arrested two days after the terrorist attacks on the United States and later admitted to plotting an attack on the Klein Brogel NATO base in Belgium.
He is currently in prison in Belgium and fighting an extradition request to face terrorism charges in the United States.
Badat described meeting several times in Afghanistan with Adnan Shukrijumah, an American al Qaeda operative. At the time he knew the American as “Jaffar.” Shukrijumah, he stated, never had any knowledge of the shoe bombing plot.
U.S. authorities allege that Shukrijumah helped orchestrate the 2009 plot to attack New York subways and met Medunjanin in a camp in South Waziristan in September 2008. They say Shukrijumah has emerged as a senior operational planner for the network and is still believed to be at large in the Afghanistan-Pakistan region.
Badat also shed light on how his motivations for traveling to Afghanistan to fight Jihad in 1999 when he was just 19. He testified that he became involved in a militant circle in London and became friends with a man called Babar Ahmad.
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